While the headlines are focusing lately on Libya, and to a lesser extend, Jordan, Lebanon, et al, the most significant country in terms of the immediate impact on the United States, and indeed the rest of the world, is Bahrain.
Why? Simple geography.
A little background. Bahrain is an island in the Straits of Hormuz. It lies closer to Saudi Arabia and is ruled by a Sunni minority. The Saudis, in case you don't know, are Sunni.
Immediately on the other side of the Strait is Iran, a Shiite country, and the Saudi's main rival (more on Iran, and the President's bizarre machinations in the next post).
There is perhaps more Sunni - Shiite antagonism than there is anti Americanism in the Middle East.
Iran is clearly demonstrating exactly what I have been writing about, nay, practically screaming about, for the last 3 years, their attempt to become not just a regional super power, but a global one.
Their sphere of domination now runs almost all the way through the Middle East (and the President's removing of US Battleships in the Mediterranean for the first time in 31 years - the unannounced reason the Iranians were allowed to send their ships through the Suez - is a major reason for this) stopping only in Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt - though less today than yesterday, and to a smaller extent, the Emirates.
I mentioned before the Sunni minority in Bahrain. That means there is a Shiite majority.
If the shiites that are now agitating there, have there way, it will mean that Iran will be in full control of the Straits. And thus, the transport of most of the oil in the Middle East, including the Saudis.
If this happens, we are looking at $10/gallon gas. Not to mention the full control of the Middle East by the Shiite minority and the new Iranian empire.
Follow the bouncing Bahrain. It holds the key.
Friday, February 25, 2011
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Democracy - 100,000, Theocracy - 1,000,000
Funny, but I have yet to see on the front page of my daily NY Times, or in that bastion of "news" that the President pushes, the Huffington Post, any stories about the speech given on Friday by the spiritual head of the Muslim brotherhood in front of 1,000,000 Egyptians in Tahrir square.
Interesting that this is a man that was deemed so dangerous he had been banned from Egypt until the new government took over. You know, the new government, same as the old government. Except that now their golden goose, the US government led by that enigma of part time democracy support, Barack Obama, told them that the new government SHOULD allow the Muslim Brotherhood to participate.
What does it say when the Brotherhood outdraws the largest of the "pro democracy" crowd of the recent 'revolution' 10-1? I think you can figure that out.
Interesting that this is a man that was deemed so dangerous he had been banned from Egypt until the new government took over. You know, the new government, same as the old government. Except that now their golden goose, the US government led by that enigma of part time democracy support, Barack Obama, told them that the new government SHOULD allow the Muslim Brotherhood to participate.
What does it say when the Brotherhood outdraws the largest of the "pro democracy" crowd of the recent 'revolution' 10-1? I think you can figure that out.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Egypt: The Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality
MORE SUPRISINGLY ACCURATE INFORMATION FROM STRATFOR AND GEORGE FRIEDMAN
By George Friedman
On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak’s fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it’s ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.
What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.
At this point, we simply don’t know what will happen. We do know what has happened. Mubarak is out of office, the military regime remains intact and it is stronger than ever. This is not surprising, given what STRATFOR has said about recent events in Egypt, but the reality of what has happened in the last 72 hours and the interpretation that much of the world has placed on it are startlingly different. Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.
Certainly, there was a large crowd concentrated in a square in Cairo, and there were demonstrations in other cities. But the crowd was limited. It never got to be more than 300,000 people or so in Tahrir Square, and while that’s a lot of people, it is nothing like the crowds that turned out during the 1989 risings in Eastern Europe or the 1979 revolution in Iran. Those were massive social convulsions in which millions came out onto the streets. The crowd in Cairo never swelled to the point that it involved a substantial portion of the city.
In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.
Mubarak and the Regime
The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature. The main drama began months ago when it became apparent that Mubarak intended to make his reform-minded 47-year-old son, Gamal, lacking in military service, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the regime. In a way, Mubarak was the one trying to overthrow the regime.
The Egyptian regime was founded in a coup led by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser and modeled after that of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, basing it on the military. It was intended to be a secular regime with democratic elements, but it would be guaranteed and ultimately controlled by the military. Nasser believed that the military was the most modern and progressive element of Egyptian society and that it had to be given the responsibility and power to modernize Egypt.
While Nasser took off his uniform, the military remained the bulwark of the regime. Each successive president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, while formally elected in elections of varying dubiousness, was an officer in the Egyptian military who had removed his uniform when he entered political life.
Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime. Mubarak’s desire to have his son succeed him appalled and enraged the Egyptian military, the defender of the regime. If he were to be appointed, then the military regime would be replaced by, in essence, a hereditary monarchy — what had ruled Egypt before the military. Large segments of the military had been maneuvering to block Mubarak’s ambitions and, with increasing intensity, wanted to see Mubarak step down in order to pave the way for an orderly succession using the elections scheduled for September, elections designed to affirm the regime by selecting a figure acceptable to the senior military men. Mubarak’s insistence on Gamal and his unwillingness to step down created a crisis for the regime. The military feared the regime could not survive Mubarak’s ambitions.
This is the key point to understand. There is a critical distinction between the regime and Hosni Mubarak. The regime consisted — and consists — of complex institutions centered on the military but also including the civilian bureaucracy controlled by the military. Hosni Mubarak was the leader of the regime, successor to Nasser and Sadat, who over time came to distinguish his interests from those of the regime. He was increasingly seen as a threat to the regime, and the regime turned on him.
The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets. The military did not like the spectacle of the crowds, which is not the way the military likes to handle political matters. At the same time, paradoxically, the military welcomed the demonstrations, since they created a crisis that put the question of Mubarak’s future on the table. They gave the military an opportunity to save the regime and preserve its own interests.
The Egyptian military is opaque. It isn’t clear who was reluctant to act and who was eager. We would guess that the people who now make up the ruling military council were reluctant to act. They were of the same generation as Hosni Mubarak, owed their careers to him and were his friends. Younger officers, who had joined the military after 1973 and had trained with the Americans rather than the Soviets, were the likely agitators for blocking Mubarak’s selection of Gamal as his heir, but there were also senior officers publicly expressing reservations. Who was on what side is a guess. What is known is that many in the military opposed Gamal, would not push the issue to a coup, and then staged a coup designed to save the regime after the demonstrations in Cairo were under way.
That is the point. What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.
Again, as a guess, the older officers, friends of Mubarak, found themselves under pressure from other officers and the United States to act. They finally did, taking the major positions for themselves. The demonstrations were the backdrop for this drama and the justification for the military’s actions, but they were not a revolution in the streets. It was a military coup designed to preserve a military-dominated regime. And that was what the crowds were demanding as well.
Coup and Revolution
We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country. Backing them out of that position, with the best will in the world, will require time. The military bought time Feb. 13, but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century.
Of course, there is the feeling, as there was in 2009 with the Tehran demonstrations, that something unheard of has taken place, as U.S. President Barack Obama has implied. It is said to have something to do with Twitter and Facebook. We should recall that, in our time, genuine revolutions that destroyed regimes took place in 1989 and 1979, the latter even before there were PCs. Indeed, such revolutions go back to the 18th century. None of them required smartphones, and all of them were more thorough and profound than what has happened in Egypt so far. This revolution will not be “Twitterized.” The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.
The new government has promised to honor all foreign commitments, which obviously include the most controversial one in Egypt, the treaty with Israel. During the celebrations the evening of Feb. 11 and morning of Feb. 12, the two chants were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts, not yet clearly defined. But then, it is not clear that the demonstrators in the square represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians. For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.
The Egyptian government is hardly in a position to confront Israel, even if it wanted to. The Egyptian army has mostly American equipment and cannot function if the Americans don’t provide spare parts or contractors to maintain that equipment. There is no Soviet Union vying to replace the United States today. Re-equipping and training a military the size of Egypt’s is measured in decades, not weeks. Egypt is not going to war any time soon. But then the new rulers have declared that all prior treaties — such as with Israel — will remain in effect.
What Was Achieved?
Therefore, we face this reality. The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.
It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it isn’t important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process, most of it not viewable on TV. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. It is not even clear what was achieved. Nor is it clear that anything that has happened changes Egyptian foreign or domestic policy. It is not even clear that those policies could be changed in practical terms regardless of intent.
The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranian revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.
An 82-year-old man has been thrown out of office, and his son will not be president. The constitution and parliament are gone and a military junta is in charge. The rest is speculation.
By George Friedman
On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak’s fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it’s ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.
What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.
At this point, we simply don’t know what will happen. We do know what has happened. Mubarak is out of office, the military regime remains intact and it is stronger than ever. This is not surprising, given what STRATFOR has said about recent events in Egypt, but the reality of what has happened in the last 72 hours and the interpretation that much of the world has placed on it are startlingly different. Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.
Certainly, there was a large crowd concentrated in a square in Cairo, and there were demonstrations in other cities. But the crowd was limited. It never got to be more than 300,000 people or so in Tahrir Square, and while that’s a lot of people, it is nothing like the crowds that turned out during the 1989 risings in Eastern Europe or the 1979 revolution in Iran. Those were massive social convulsions in which millions came out onto the streets. The crowd in Cairo never swelled to the point that it involved a substantial portion of the city.
In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.
Mubarak and the Regime
The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature. The main drama began months ago when it became apparent that Mubarak intended to make his reform-minded 47-year-old son, Gamal, lacking in military service, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the regime. In a way, Mubarak was the one trying to overthrow the regime.
The Egyptian regime was founded in a coup led by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser and modeled after that of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, basing it on the military. It was intended to be a secular regime with democratic elements, but it would be guaranteed and ultimately controlled by the military. Nasser believed that the military was the most modern and progressive element of Egyptian society and that it had to be given the responsibility and power to modernize Egypt.
While Nasser took off his uniform, the military remained the bulwark of the regime. Each successive president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, while formally elected in elections of varying dubiousness, was an officer in the Egyptian military who had removed his uniform when he entered political life.
Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime. Mubarak’s desire to have his son succeed him appalled and enraged the Egyptian military, the defender of the regime. If he were to be appointed, then the military regime would be replaced by, in essence, a hereditary monarchy — what had ruled Egypt before the military. Large segments of the military had been maneuvering to block Mubarak’s ambitions and, with increasing intensity, wanted to see Mubarak step down in order to pave the way for an orderly succession using the elections scheduled for September, elections designed to affirm the regime by selecting a figure acceptable to the senior military men. Mubarak’s insistence on Gamal and his unwillingness to step down created a crisis for the regime. The military feared the regime could not survive Mubarak’s ambitions.
This is the key point to understand. There is a critical distinction between the regime and Hosni Mubarak. The regime consisted — and consists — of complex institutions centered on the military but also including the civilian bureaucracy controlled by the military. Hosni Mubarak was the leader of the regime, successor to Nasser and Sadat, who over time came to distinguish his interests from those of the regime. He was increasingly seen as a threat to the regime, and the regime turned on him.
The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets. The military did not like the spectacle of the crowds, which is not the way the military likes to handle political matters. At the same time, paradoxically, the military welcomed the demonstrations, since they created a crisis that put the question of Mubarak’s future on the table. They gave the military an opportunity to save the regime and preserve its own interests.
The Egyptian military is opaque. It isn’t clear who was reluctant to act and who was eager. We would guess that the people who now make up the ruling military council were reluctant to act. They were of the same generation as Hosni Mubarak, owed their careers to him and were his friends. Younger officers, who had joined the military after 1973 and had trained with the Americans rather than the Soviets, were the likely agitators for blocking Mubarak’s selection of Gamal as his heir, but there were also senior officers publicly expressing reservations. Who was on what side is a guess. What is known is that many in the military opposed Gamal, would not push the issue to a coup, and then staged a coup designed to save the regime after the demonstrations in Cairo were under way.
That is the point. What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.
Again, as a guess, the older officers, friends of Mubarak, found themselves under pressure from other officers and the United States to act. They finally did, taking the major positions for themselves. The demonstrations were the backdrop for this drama and the justification for the military’s actions, but they were not a revolution in the streets. It was a military coup designed to preserve a military-dominated regime. And that was what the crowds were demanding as well.
Coup and Revolution
We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country. Backing them out of that position, with the best will in the world, will require time. The military bought time Feb. 13, but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century.
Of course, there is the feeling, as there was in 2009 with the Tehran demonstrations, that something unheard of has taken place, as U.S. President Barack Obama has implied. It is said to have something to do with Twitter and Facebook. We should recall that, in our time, genuine revolutions that destroyed regimes took place in 1989 and 1979, the latter even before there were PCs. Indeed, such revolutions go back to the 18th century. None of them required smartphones, and all of them were more thorough and profound than what has happened in Egypt so far. This revolution will not be “Twitterized.” The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.
The new government has promised to honor all foreign commitments, which obviously include the most controversial one in Egypt, the treaty with Israel. During the celebrations the evening of Feb. 11 and morning of Feb. 12, the two chants were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts, not yet clearly defined. But then, it is not clear that the demonstrators in the square represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians. For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.
The Egyptian government is hardly in a position to confront Israel, even if it wanted to. The Egyptian army has mostly American equipment and cannot function if the Americans don’t provide spare parts or contractors to maintain that equipment. There is no Soviet Union vying to replace the United States today. Re-equipping and training a military the size of Egypt’s is measured in decades, not weeks. Egypt is not going to war any time soon. But then the new rulers have declared that all prior treaties — such as with Israel — will remain in effect.
What Was Achieved?
Therefore, we face this reality. The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.
It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it isn’t important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process, most of it not viewable on TV. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. It is not even clear what was achieved. Nor is it clear that anything that has happened changes Egyptian foreign or domestic policy. It is not even clear that those policies could be changed in practical terms regardless of intent.
The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranian revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.
An 82-year-old man has been thrown out of office, and his son will not be president. The constitution and parliament are gone and a military junta is in charge. The rest is speculation.
Friday, February 11, 2011
More background: Egypt, Israel and a Strategic Reconsideration
I am not a huge fan of George Friedman, a name being heard more and more frequently because of his site Stratfor.
Generally I find his analysis' simplistic and superficial. He is widely read, however.
Here, his concluding statements reflect what I have been describing for years to my many friends in Israel, and here in the states.
What Friedman misses, incredibly, is that the Egyptian army has been training, and in recent years intensifying that training, to invade Israel. In fact, ALL of their military official "maneuvers" are mock invasions across the Sinai. In addition, they have been remilitarizing the Sinai, in abrogation of the Camp David Accords, for many years.
By George Friedman of Stratfor
The events in Egypt have sent shock waves through Israel. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In three of the four wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. In 1948, 1967 and 1973, credible scenarios existed in which the Israelis were defeated and the state of Israel ceased to exist. In 1973, it appeared for several days that one of those scenarios was unfolding.
The survival of Israel was no longer at stake after 1978. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Israeli interests were involved, but not survival. There is a huge difference between the two. Israel had achieved a geopolitical ideal after 1978 in which it had divided and effectively made peace with two of the four Arab states that bordered it, and neutralized one of those states. The treaty with Egypt removed the threat to the Negev and the southern coastal approaches to Tel Aviv.
The agreement with Jordan in 1994, which formalized a long-standing relationship, secured the longest and most vulnerable border along the Jordan River. The situation in Lebanon was such that whatever threat emerged from there was limited. Only Syria remained hostile but, by itself, it could not threaten Israel. Damascus was far more focused on Lebanon anyway. As for the Palestinians, they posed a problem for Israel, but without the foreign military forces along the frontiers, the Palestinians could trouble but not destroy Israel. Israel's existence was not at stake, nor was it an issue for 33 years.
THE HISTORIC EGYPTIAN THREAT TO ISRAEL
The center of gravity of Israel's strategic challenge was always Egypt. The largest Arab country, with about 80 million people, Egypt could field the most substantial army. More to the point, Egypt could absorb casualties at a far higher rate than Israel. The danger that the Egyptian army posed was that it could close with the Israelis and engage in extended, high-intensity combat that would break the back of Israel Defense Forces by imposing a rate of attrition that Israel could not sustain. If Israel were to be simultaneously engaged with Syria, dividing its forces and its logistical capabilities, it could run out of troops long before Egypt, even if Egypt were absorbing far more casualties.
The solution for the Israelis was to initiate combat at a time and place of their own choosing, preferably with surprise, as they did in 1956 and 1967. Failing that, as they did in 1973, the Israelis would be forced into a holding action they could not sustain and forced onto an offensive in which the risks of failure — and the possibility — would be substantial.
It was to the great benefit of Israel that Egyptian forces were generally poorly commanded and trained and that Egyptian war-fighting doctrine, derived from Britain and the Soviet Union, was not suited to the battle problem Israel posed. In 1967, Israel won its most complete victory over Egypt, as well as Jordan and Syria. It appeared to the Israelis that the Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular were culturally incapable of mastering modern warfare.
Thus it was an extraordinary shock when, just six years after their 1967 defeat, the Egyptians mounted a two-army assault across the Suez, coordinated with a simultaneous Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. Even more stunning than the assault was the operational security the Egyptians maintained and the degree of surprise they achieved. One of Israel's fundamental assumptions was that Israeli intelligence would provide ample warning of an attack. And one of the fundamental assumptions of Israeli intelligence was that Egypt could not mount an attack while Israel maintained air superiority. Both assumptions were wrong. But the most important error was the assumption that Egypt could not, by itself, coordinate a massive and complex military operation. In the end, the Israelis defeated the Egyptians, but at the cost of the confidence they achieved in 1967 and a recognition that comfortable assumptions were impermissible in warfare in general and regarding Egypt in particular.
The Egyptians had also learned lessons. The most important was that the existence of the state of Israel did not represent a challenge to Egypt's national interest. Israel existed across a fairly wide and inhospitable buffer zone — the Sinai Peninsula. The logistical problems involved in deploying a massive force to the east had resulted in three major defeats, while the single partial victory took place on much shorter lines of supply. Holding or taking the Sinai was difficult and possible only with a massive infusion of weapons and supplies from the outside, from the Soviet Union. This meant that Egypt was a hostage to Soviet interests. Egypt had a greater interest in breaking its dependency on the Soviets than in defeating Israel. It could do the former more readily than the latter.
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The Egyptian recognition that its interests in Israel were minimal and the Israeli recognition that eliminating the potential threat from Egypt guaranteed its national security have been the foundation of the regional balance since 1978. All other considerations — Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and the rest — were trivial in comparison. Geography — the Sinai — made this strategic distancing possible. So did American aid to Egypt. The substitution of American weapons for Soviet ones in the years after the treaty achieved two things. First, they ended Egypt's dependency on the Soviets. Second, they further guaranteed Israel's security by creating an Egyptian army dependent on a steady flow of spare parts and contractors from the United States. Cut the flow and the Egyptian army would be crippled.
The governments of Anwar Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak were content with this arrangement. The generation that came to power with Gamal Nasser had fought four wars with Israel and had little stomach for any more. They had proved themselves in October 1973 on the Suez and had no appetite to fight again or to send their sons to war. It is not that they created an oasis of prosperity in Egypt. But they no longer had to go to war every few years, and they were able, as military officers, to live good lives. What is now regarded as corruption was then regarded as just rewards for bleeding in four wars against the Israelis.
MUBARAK AND THE MILITARY
But now is 33 years later, and the world has changed. The generation that fought is very old. Today's Egyptian military trains with the Americans, and its officers pass through the American command and staff and war colleges. This generation has close ties to the United States, but not nearly as close ties to the British-trained generation that fought the Israelis or to Egypt's former patrons, the Russians. Mubarak has locked the younger generation, in their fifties and sixties, out of senior command positions and away from the wealth his generation has accumulated. They want him out.
For this younger generation, the idea of Gamal Mubarak being allowed to take over the presidency was the last straw. They wanted the elder Mubarak to leave not only because he had ambitions for his son but also because he didn't want to leave after more than a quarter century of pressure. Mubarak wanted guarantees that, if he left, his possessions, in addition to his honor, would remain intact. If Gamal could not be president, then no one's promise had value. So Mubarak locked himself into position.
The cameras love demonstrations, but they are frequently not the real story. The demonstrators who wanted democracy are a real faction, but they don't speak for the shopkeepers and peasants more interested in prosperity than wealth. Since Egypt is a Muslim country, the West freezes when anything happens, dreading the hand of Osama bin Laden. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was once a powerful force, and it might become one again someday, but right now it is a shadow of its former self. What is going on now is a struggle within the military, between generations, for the future of the Egyptian military and therefore the heart of the Egyptian regime. Mubarak will leave, the younger officers will emerge, the constitution will make some changes and life will continue.
The Israelis will return to their complacency. They should not. The usual first warning of a heart attack is death. Among the fortunate, it is a mild coronary followed by a dramatic change of life style. The events in Egypt should be taken as a mild coronary and treated with great relief by Israel that it wasn't worse.
RECONSIDERING THE ISRAELI POSITION
I have laid out the reasons why the 1978 treaty is in Egypt's national interest. I have left out two pieces. The first is ideology. The ideological tenor of the Middle East prior to 1978 was secular and socialist. Today it is increasingly Islamist. Egypt is not immune to this trend, even if the Muslim Brotherhood should not be seen as the embodiment of that threat. Second, military technology, skills and terrain have made Egypt a defensive power for the past 33 years. But military technology and skills can change, on both sides. Egyptian defensiveness is built on assumptions of Israeli military capability and interest. As Israeli ideology becomes more militant and as its capabilities grow, Egypt may be forced to reconsider its strategic posture. As new generations of officers arise, who have heard of war only from their grandfathers, the fear of war declines and the desire for glory grows. Combine that with ideology in Egypt and Israel and things change. They won't change quickly — a generation of military transformation will be needed once regimes have changed and the decisions to prepare for war have been made — but they can change.
Two things from this should strike the Israelis. The first is how badly they need peace with Egypt. It is easy to forget what things were like 40 years back, but it is important to remember that the prosperity of Israel today depends in part on the treaty with Egypt. Iran is a distant abstraction, with a notional bomb whose completion date keeps moving. Israel can fight many wars with Egypt and win. It need lose only one. The second lesson is that Israel should do everything possible to make certain that the transfer of power in Egypt is from Mubarak to the next generation of military officers and that these officers maintain their credibility in Egypt. Whether Israel likes it or not, there is an Islamist movement in Egypt. Whether the new generation controls that movement as the previous one did or whether they succumb to it is the existential question for Israel. If the treaty with Egypt is the foundation of Israel's national security, it is logical that the Israelis should do everything possible to preserve it.
This was not the fatal heart attack. It might not even have been more than indigestion. But recent events in Egypt point to a long-term problem with Israeli strategy. Given the strategic and ideological crosscurrents in Egypt, it is in Israel's national interest to minimize the intensity of the ideological and make certain that Israel is not perceived as a threat. In Gaza, for example, Israel and Egypt may have shared a common interest in containing Hamas, and the next generation of Egyptian officers may share it as well. But what didn't materialize in the streets this time could in the future: an Islamist rising. In that case, the Egyptian military might find it in its interest to preserve its power by accommodating the Islamists. At this point, Egypt becomes the problem and not part of the solution.
Keeping Egypt from coming to this is the imperative of military dispassion. If the long-term center of gravity of Israel's national security is at least the neutrality of Egypt, then doing everything to maintain that is a military requirement. That military requirement must be carried out by political means. That requires the recognition of priorities. The future of Gaza or the precise borders of a Palestinian state are trivial compared to preserving the treaty with Egypt. If it is found that a particular political strategy undermines the strategic requirement, then that political strategy must be sacrificed.
In other words, the worst-case scenario for Israel would be a return to the pre-1978 relationship with Egypt without a settlement with the Palestinians. That would open the door for a potential two-front war with an intifada in the middle.
There are those in Israel who would argue that any release in pressure on the Palestinians will be met with rejection. If that is true, then, in my view, that is catastrophic news for Israel. In due course, ideological shifts and recalculations of Israeli intentions will cause a change in Egyptian policy. This will take several decades to turn into effective military force, and the first conflicts may well end in Israeli victory. But, as I have said before, it must always be remembered that no matter how many times Israel wins, it need only lose once to be annihilated.
To some it means that Israel should remain as strong as possible. To me it means that Israel should avoid rolling the dice too often, regardless of how strong it thinks it is. The Mubarak affair might open a strategic reconsideration of the Israeli position.
Generally I find his analysis' simplistic and superficial. He is widely read, however.
Here, his concluding statements reflect what I have been describing for years to my many friends in Israel, and here in the states.
What Friedman misses, incredibly, is that the Egyptian army has been training, and in recent years intensifying that training, to invade Israel. In fact, ALL of their military official "maneuvers" are mock invasions across the Sinai. In addition, they have been remilitarizing the Sinai, in abrogation of the Camp David Accords, for many years.
By George Friedman of Stratfor
The events in Egypt have sent shock waves through Israel. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In three of the four wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. In 1948, 1967 and 1973, credible scenarios existed in which the Israelis were defeated and the state of Israel ceased to exist. In 1973, it appeared for several days that one of those scenarios was unfolding.
The survival of Israel was no longer at stake after 1978. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Israeli interests were involved, but not survival. There is a huge difference between the two. Israel had achieved a geopolitical ideal after 1978 in which it had divided and effectively made peace with two of the four Arab states that bordered it, and neutralized one of those states. The treaty with Egypt removed the threat to the Negev and the southern coastal approaches to Tel Aviv.
The agreement with Jordan in 1994, which formalized a long-standing relationship, secured the longest and most vulnerable border along the Jordan River. The situation in Lebanon was such that whatever threat emerged from there was limited. Only Syria remained hostile but, by itself, it could not threaten Israel. Damascus was far more focused on Lebanon anyway. As for the Palestinians, they posed a problem for Israel, but without the foreign military forces along the frontiers, the Palestinians could trouble but not destroy Israel. Israel's existence was not at stake, nor was it an issue for 33 years.
THE HISTORIC EGYPTIAN THREAT TO ISRAEL
The center of gravity of Israel's strategic challenge was always Egypt. The largest Arab country, with about 80 million people, Egypt could field the most substantial army. More to the point, Egypt could absorb casualties at a far higher rate than Israel. The danger that the Egyptian army posed was that it could close with the Israelis and engage in extended, high-intensity combat that would break the back of Israel Defense Forces by imposing a rate of attrition that Israel could not sustain. If Israel were to be simultaneously engaged with Syria, dividing its forces and its logistical capabilities, it could run out of troops long before Egypt, even if Egypt were absorbing far more casualties.
The solution for the Israelis was to initiate combat at a time and place of their own choosing, preferably with surprise, as they did in 1956 and 1967. Failing that, as they did in 1973, the Israelis would be forced into a holding action they could not sustain and forced onto an offensive in which the risks of failure — and the possibility — would be substantial.
It was to the great benefit of Israel that Egyptian forces were generally poorly commanded and trained and that Egyptian war-fighting doctrine, derived from Britain and the Soviet Union, was not suited to the battle problem Israel posed. In 1967, Israel won its most complete victory over Egypt, as well as Jordan and Syria. It appeared to the Israelis that the Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular were culturally incapable of mastering modern warfare.
Thus it was an extraordinary shock when, just six years after their 1967 defeat, the Egyptians mounted a two-army assault across the Suez, coordinated with a simultaneous Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. Even more stunning than the assault was the operational security the Egyptians maintained and the degree of surprise they achieved. One of Israel's fundamental assumptions was that Israeli intelligence would provide ample warning of an attack. And one of the fundamental assumptions of Israeli intelligence was that Egypt could not mount an attack while Israel maintained air superiority. Both assumptions were wrong. But the most important error was the assumption that Egypt could not, by itself, coordinate a massive and complex military operation. In the end, the Israelis defeated the Egyptians, but at the cost of the confidence they achieved in 1967 and a recognition that comfortable assumptions were impermissible in warfare in general and regarding Egypt in particular.
The Egyptians had also learned lessons. The most important was that the existence of the state of Israel did not represent a challenge to Egypt's national interest. Israel existed across a fairly wide and inhospitable buffer zone — the Sinai Peninsula. The logistical problems involved in deploying a massive force to the east had resulted in three major defeats, while the single partial victory took place on much shorter lines of supply. Holding or taking the Sinai was difficult and possible only with a massive infusion of weapons and supplies from the outside, from the Soviet Union. This meant that Egypt was a hostage to Soviet interests. Egypt had a greater interest in breaking its dependency on the Soviets than in defeating Israel. It could do the former more readily than the latter.
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The Egyptian recognition that its interests in Israel were minimal and the Israeli recognition that eliminating the potential threat from Egypt guaranteed its national security have been the foundation of the regional balance since 1978. All other considerations — Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and the rest — were trivial in comparison. Geography — the Sinai — made this strategic distancing possible. So did American aid to Egypt. The substitution of American weapons for Soviet ones in the years after the treaty achieved two things. First, they ended Egypt's dependency on the Soviets. Second, they further guaranteed Israel's security by creating an Egyptian army dependent on a steady flow of spare parts and contractors from the United States. Cut the flow and the Egyptian army would be crippled.
The governments of Anwar Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak were content with this arrangement. The generation that came to power with Gamal Nasser had fought four wars with Israel and had little stomach for any more. They had proved themselves in October 1973 on the Suez and had no appetite to fight again or to send their sons to war. It is not that they created an oasis of prosperity in Egypt. But they no longer had to go to war every few years, and they were able, as military officers, to live good lives. What is now regarded as corruption was then regarded as just rewards for bleeding in four wars against the Israelis.
MUBARAK AND THE MILITARY
But now is 33 years later, and the world has changed. The generation that fought is very old. Today's Egyptian military trains with the Americans, and its officers pass through the American command and staff and war colleges. This generation has close ties to the United States, but not nearly as close ties to the British-trained generation that fought the Israelis or to Egypt's former patrons, the Russians. Mubarak has locked the younger generation, in their fifties and sixties, out of senior command positions and away from the wealth his generation has accumulated. They want him out.
For this younger generation, the idea of Gamal Mubarak being allowed to take over the presidency was the last straw. They wanted the elder Mubarak to leave not only because he had ambitions for his son but also because he didn't want to leave after more than a quarter century of pressure. Mubarak wanted guarantees that, if he left, his possessions, in addition to his honor, would remain intact. If Gamal could not be president, then no one's promise had value. So Mubarak locked himself into position.
The cameras love demonstrations, but they are frequently not the real story. The demonstrators who wanted democracy are a real faction, but they don't speak for the shopkeepers and peasants more interested in prosperity than wealth. Since Egypt is a Muslim country, the West freezes when anything happens, dreading the hand of Osama bin Laden. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was once a powerful force, and it might become one again someday, but right now it is a shadow of its former self. What is going on now is a struggle within the military, between generations, for the future of the Egyptian military and therefore the heart of the Egyptian regime. Mubarak will leave, the younger officers will emerge, the constitution will make some changes and life will continue.
The Israelis will return to their complacency. They should not. The usual first warning of a heart attack is death. Among the fortunate, it is a mild coronary followed by a dramatic change of life style. The events in Egypt should be taken as a mild coronary and treated with great relief by Israel that it wasn't worse.
RECONSIDERING THE ISRAELI POSITION
I have laid out the reasons why the 1978 treaty is in Egypt's national interest. I have left out two pieces. The first is ideology. The ideological tenor of the Middle East prior to 1978 was secular and socialist. Today it is increasingly Islamist. Egypt is not immune to this trend, even if the Muslim Brotherhood should not be seen as the embodiment of that threat. Second, military technology, skills and terrain have made Egypt a defensive power for the past 33 years. But military technology and skills can change, on both sides. Egyptian defensiveness is built on assumptions of Israeli military capability and interest. As Israeli ideology becomes more militant and as its capabilities grow, Egypt may be forced to reconsider its strategic posture. As new generations of officers arise, who have heard of war only from their grandfathers, the fear of war declines and the desire for glory grows. Combine that with ideology in Egypt and Israel and things change. They won't change quickly — a generation of military transformation will be needed once regimes have changed and the decisions to prepare for war have been made — but they can change.
Two things from this should strike the Israelis. The first is how badly they need peace with Egypt. It is easy to forget what things were like 40 years back, but it is important to remember that the prosperity of Israel today depends in part on the treaty with Egypt. Iran is a distant abstraction, with a notional bomb whose completion date keeps moving. Israel can fight many wars with Egypt and win. It need lose only one. The second lesson is that Israel should do everything possible to make certain that the transfer of power in Egypt is from Mubarak to the next generation of military officers and that these officers maintain their credibility in Egypt. Whether Israel likes it or not, there is an Islamist movement in Egypt. Whether the new generation controls that movement as the previous one did or whether they succumb to it is the existential question for Israel. If the treaty with Egypt is the foundation of Israel's national security, it is logical that the Israelis should do everything possible to preserve it.
This was not the fatal heart attack. It might not even have been more than indigestion. But recent events in Egypt point to a long-term problem with Israeli strategy. Given the strategic and ideological crosscurrents in Egypt, it is in Israel's national interest to minimize the intensity of the ideological and make certain that Israel is not perceived as a threat. In Gaza, for example, Israel and Egypt may have shared a common interest in containing Hamas, and the next generation of Egyptian officers may share it as well. But what didn't materialize in the streets this time could in the future: an Islamist rising. In that case, the Egyptian military might find it in its interest to preserve its power by accommodating the Islamists. At this point, Egypt becomes the problem and not part of the solution.
Keeping Egypt from coming to this is the imperative of military dispassion. If the long-term center of gravity of Israel's national security is at least the neutrality of Egypt, then doing everything to maintain that is a military requirement. That military requirement must be carried out by political means. That requires the recognition of priorities. The future of Gaza or the precise borders of a Palestinian state are trivial compared to preserving the treaty with Egypt. If it is found that a particular political strategy undermines the strategic requirement, then that political strategy must be sacrificed.
In other words, the worst-case scenario for Israel would be a return to the pre-1978 relationship with Egypt without a settlement with the Palestinians. That would open the door for a potential two-front war with an intifada in the middle.
There are those in Israel who would argue that any release in pressure on the Palestinians will be met with rejection. If that is true, then, in my view, that is catastrophic news for Israel. In due course, ideological shifts and recalculations of Israeli intentions will cause a change in Egyptian policy. This will take several decades to turn into effective military force, and the first conflicts may well end in Israeli victory. But, as I have said before, it must always be remembered that no matter how many times Israel wins, it need only lose once to be annihilated.
To some it means that Israel should remain as strong as possible. To me it means that Israel should avoid rolling the dice too often, regardless of how strong it thinks it is. The Mubarak affair might open a strategic reconsideration of the Israeli position.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Background heah, get ya' background heah, Egypt background heah'...
I realize that few people have as big an interest in the Middle East as I.
Egypt is one of my particular area of interests. Why? Well, lots of reasons. One unique thing about Egypt that separates it from the rest of the Arab world is it's appreciation for it's own past.
I'm sure many of you has seen Dr. Zawi Hawass at one time or another. He's the old man that dresses like Indiana Jones and is in charge of Egypts entire archeologic community. I don't know if Hawass is truly antisemitic, but as an employee of the government he has made obscenely antisemitic statements in the past. Why do I mention this? For the following reason.
One of the incredible archeologic sites in Egypt is a synagogue. Not just any synagogue, but the Rav Moshe synagogue. For non Jews, it may have no meaning, but it was the home site of the Rabbi who became known as Maimonides. You can look him up, if interested. He is considered one of the towering intellectual figures in history, on par with Da Vinci. He was a practicing physician. His most famous patient? Saladin, who drove the Catholics out of Jerusalem. Maimonedes full name was Mussa bin Maimun ibn Abdallah al-Qurtubi al-Israili. That, in and of itself, should tell you of the close ties between the Egyptians and Jews. This synagogue dates to the 12th century. What is amazing is the Hawass led the restoration of this synagogue. Demanded it even. As he has with numerous churches. Why? There are no Jews effectively left in Egypt. Certainly no active synagogues. Because he has said that ALL history of Egypt is important.
It is this attitude, and the long non Muslim history of Egypt that gives it it's unique attitude in the Arab world.
So, that is one reason. Another being the way I have always been treated there. Despite arriving from Israel, with a clearly Jewish name, I was never harassed, and, while my guides were Coptics, was always treated wonderfully.
So, for the next few posts, I want to provide some background to the current situation. Why? Again, because there is so much misinformation floating around. For example. Are you aware that the current President, Hosni Mubarak, was installed BY the Muslim Brotherhood? This seems to have been forgotten.
Are you aware that in 2004-5 he began to enact real reforms under pressure from George Bush. Allowing free flow of the internet, for example (where did that lead?).
So, I will repost several outside articles to give you a frame of reference.
Here's the first.
A look at the major players in Egypt's political crisis
By Jonathan S. Landay and Miret El Naggar
CAIRO — (MCT) Although President Hosni Mubarak announced Tuesday that he wouldn't run for a sixth consecutive term, he will retain a considerable ability to influence the political upheaval unleashed by the biggest anti-government protests in his 30-year rule.
Here are brief profiles of Mubarak and some other major players in the crisis roiling the most populous nation of the Arab world.
—President Hosni Mubarak
Mubarak was born in the Nile Delta province of Menoufiya in 1928 and graduated from Egypt's prestigious Military Academy in 1949. A pilot, he participated in two major wars — 1967 and 1973 — with Israel.
Mubarak rose to the rank of general and commanded the air force during 1973 conflict. He became president after the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat by army officers opposed to peace with Israel. He promptly imposed the emergency rule that the regime has used ever since to justify arbitrary arrests, infinite detentions and other harsh measures against opponents.
He became a close U.S. ally, preserving Sadat's 1978 peace treaty with Israel and ruthlessly pursuing Islamic extremists. Since 2004, he's permitted criticism of his regime by independent news media and bloggers, and allowed some protests. At the same time, Mubarak gave the police free reign to crackdown on his political opponents, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.
During his 30-year rule, Egyptians endured rising food prices, deteriorating infrastructure and public services and high unemployment, especially among the young. They also complained of rampant official corruption symbolized by businessmen appointed to Cabinet positions and top posts in the ruling National Democratic Party.
—Mohamed ElBaradei
ElBaradei, 69, gained prominence as the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, winning the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize for the agency's work.
While some opposition activists consider him a unifying figure who could win the presidency, others regard him as too pro-Western and an opportunist who remained outside the country for years while they took on the regime.
ElBaradei was born in 1942 to a well-off Cairo family. His father headed the Egyptian Bar Association.
He obtained a law degree at Cairo University and went to work for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. He earned an international law degree at New York University Law School in 1974.
In 1984, ElBaradei became a senior official at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. He was selected in 1997 as the agency's director general, a position in which he took on the regimes of North Korea, Iraq and Iran.
But he also disputed the Bush administration's justification for invading Iraq, saying there was no evidence that Iraq had rebuilt its nuclear arms program. He also challenged U.S. charges that Iran was close to developing a warhead.
The U.S. was the only country to oppose ElBaradei's reappointment to a third term as IAEA chief in 2005, eventually dropping its objections.
After leaving the IAEA in 2009, he returned to Egypt to co-found the National Association for Change, a loose coalition of opposition groups, and said that he was prepared to contest this year's presidential election.
—Muslim Brotherhood
Started by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of Egypt's oldest political organizations and its largest, most cohesive opposition movement.
In its contemporary incarnation, the brotherhood forswears violence and opposes al-Qaida, embraces the democratic process, and says women can hold public office, except for the presidency. It is fiercely critical of Israel and the United States, but it says it would preserve the peace accord with Israel.
The brotherhood was founded to promote Islamic morals and charitable works with the stated goal of making the Quran and Sharia the "sole reference point for . . . ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community . . . and state." One of its key slogans is "Islam is the solution."
The organization's political involvement grew out of its agitation for an end to British colonial rule. The brotherhood supported a 1952 military coup that brought Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. But he outlawed the movement in 1954, jailing and killing hundreds of activists. Others fled, establishing branches abroad.
The movement moved underground. A leading member, Sayyid Qutb, is regarded as inspiring the founding of al-Qaida and other radical groups by advocating the establishment of Islamic rule through jihad. Qutb was accused of trying to overthrow the government and hanged in 1966.
The mainstream movement re-emerged in the 1980s, seeking to join the political mainstream. It built a large following by providing social services and appealing to the religious sentiments of Egypt's conservative Muslim-dominated population.
It won an unprecedented 88 seats in Parliament in 2005 by having its candidates run as independents. During the 2010 election campaign, the regime cracked down so severely on the movement that it boycotted the vote.
—Omar Suleiman
Born in the impoverished Upper Egypt governate of Qena in 1936, Mubarak's former intelligence chief was appointed first vice president last weekend.
Not much is known about Suleiman, 75, who kept a low profile in line with his previous post as intelligence czar, a go-between Israel and Palestinians who was close to the U.S. and Mubarak's most trusted adviser and troubleshooter.
Some experts suggest that he could lead a transitional government. But many protesters have rejected that idea, chanting that he, too, should leave office.
Stephen P. Cohen, a U.S. scholar who has served as an intermediary between Arab and Israeli leaders and has known Suleiman for years, said Suleiman has no interest in taking over from Mubarak.
"He sees his main responsibility now to make sure that there is no confrontation between the military and the people," said Cohen, the head of the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development. "That he considers a disastrous outcome that would challenge the very nature of the state."
Suleiman, who's fluent in English, is said to be brilliant, urbane and well-read.
But as head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, or EGIS, he's closely identified with the abuses meted out to Mubarak's opponents. He also worked closely with the CIA on renditions of al-Qaida operatives, including one who was tortured in Egyptian custody.
Suleiman entered the Military Academy in 1954 and served as an army officer during the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel. He rose to become deputy chief of military intelligence in 1986.
In frequent contact with Mubarak, he was elevated to EGIS director in 1993, a post in which he directed a harsh clampdown on Islamic extremists.
He reportedly sealed his position of trust with Mubarak by insisting on having an armored car flown into Ethiopia for a 1995 visit there by the Egyptian strongman. The vehicle saved the pair from an ambush by Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa.
—Ayman Nour
Nour, a lawyer and a former member of Parliament, is the founder of the opposition al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. He ran a distant second to Mubarak in the country's first multi-candidate presidential election in 2006.
The following year, Nour was jailed and spent more than three years behind bars on disputed charges that he used forged signatures to start his party. He suffered ill-health while in jail and the Bush administration repeatedly called for his release, infuriating Mubarak.
While Nour, 46, was in jail, his party split into factions and its headquarters caught fire.
After his release, Nour resumed his opposition activities and regularly attended anti-Mubarak demonstrations.
Nour was a founder of the National Association for Change, the informal movement of secular and Islamic opposition groups pressing for constitutional changes that would allow ElBaradei to run for president this year.
Egypt is one of my particular area of interests. Why? Well, lots of reasons. One unique thing about Egypt that separates it from the rest of the Arab world is it's appreciation for it's own past.
I'm sure many of you has seen Dr. Zawi Hawass at one time or another. He's the old man that dresses like Indiana Jones and is in charge of Egypts entire archeologic community. I don't know if Hawass is truly antisemitic, but as an employee of the government he has made obscenely antisemitic statements in the past. Why do I mention this? For the following reason.
One of the incredible archeologic sites in Egypt is a synagogue. Not just any synagogue, but the Rav Moshe synagogue. For non Jews, it may have no meaning, but it was the home site of the Rabbi who became known as Maimonides. You can look him up, if interested. He is considered one of the towering intellectual figures in history, on par with Da Vinci. He was a practicing physician. His most famous patient? Saladin, who drove the Catholics out of Jerusalem. Maimonedes full name was Mussa bin Maimun ibn Abdallah al-Qurtubi al-Israili. That, in and of itself, should tell you of the close ties between the Egyptians and Jews. This synagogue dates to the 12th century. What is amazing is the Hawass led the restoration of this synagogue. Demanded it even. As he has with numerous churches. Why? There are no Jews effectively left in Egypt. Certainly no active synagogues. Because he has said that ALL history of Egypt is important.
It is this attitude, and the long non Muslim history of Egypt that gives it it's unique attitude in the Arab world.
So, that is one reason. Another being the way I have always been treated there. Despite arriving from Israel, with a clearly Jewish name, I was never harassed, and, while my guides were Coptics, was always treated wonderfully.
So, for the next few posts, I want to provide some background to the current situation. Why? Again, because there is so much misinformation floating around. For example. Are you aware that the current President, Hosni Mubarak, was installed BY the Muslim Brotherhood? This seems to have been forgotten.
Are you aware that in 2004-5 he began to enact real reforms under pressure from George Bush. Allowing free flow of the internet, for example (where did that lead?).
So, I will repost several outside articles to give you a frame of reference.
Here's the first.
A look at the major players in Egypt's political crisis
By Jonathan S. Landay and Miret El Naggar
CAIRO — (MCT) Although President Hosni Mubarak announced Tuesday that he wouldn't run for a sixth consecutive term, he will retain a considerable ability to influence the political upheaval unleashed by the biggest anti-government protests in his 30-year rule.
Here are brief profiles of Mubarak and some other major players in the crisis roiling the most populous nation of the Arab world.
—President Hosni Mubarak
Mubarak was born in the Nile Delta province of Menoufiya in 1928 and graduated from Egypt's prestigious Military Academy in 1949. A pilot, he participated in two major wars — 1967 and 1973 — with Israel.
Mubarak rose to the rank of general and commanded the air force during 1973 conflict. He became president after the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat by army officers opposed to peace with Israel. He promptly imposed the emergency rule that the regime has used ever since to justify arbitrary arrests, infinite detentions and other harsh measures against opponents.
He became a close U.S. ally, preserving Sadat's 1978 peace treaty with Israel and ruthlessly pursuing Islamic extremists. Since 2004, he's permitted criticism of his regime by independent news media and bloggers, and allowed some protests. At the same time, Mubarak gave the police free reign to crackdown on his political opponents, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.
During his 30-year rule, Egyptians endured rising food prices, deteriorating infrastructure and public services and high unemployment, especially among the young. They also complained of rampant official corruption symbolized by businessmen appointed to Cabinet positions and top posts in the ruling National Democratic Party.
—Mohamed ElBaradei
ElBaradei, 69, gained prominence as the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, winning the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize for the agency's work.
While some opposition activists consider him a unifying figure who could win the presidency, others regard him as too pro-Western and an opportunist who remained outside the country for years while they took on the regime.
ElBaradei was born in 1942 to a well-off Cairo family. His father headed the Egyptian Bar Association.
He obtained a law degree at Cairo University and went to work for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. He earned an international law degree at New York University Law School in 1974.
In 1984, ElBaradei became a senior official at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. He was selected in 1997 as the agency's director general, a position in which he took on the regimes of North Korea, Iraq and Iran.
But he also disputed the Bush administration's justification for invading Iraq, saying there was no evidence that Iraq had rebuilt its nuclear arms program. He also challenged U.S. charges that Iran was close to developing a warhead.
The U.S. was the only country to oppose ElBaradei's reappointment to a third term as IAEA chief in 2005, eventually dropping its objections.
After leaving the IAEA in 2009, he returned to Egypt to co-found the National Association for Change, a loose coalition of opposition groups, and said that he was prepared to contest this year's presidential election.
—Muslim Brotherhood
Started by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of Egypt's oldest political organizations and its largest, most cohesive opposition movement.
In its contemporary incarnation, the brotherhood forswears violence and opposes al-Qaida, embraces the democratic process, and says women can hold public office, except for the presidency. It is fiercely critical of Israel and the United States, but it says it would preserve the peace accord with Israel.
The brotherhood was founded to promote Islamic morals and charitable works with the stated goal of making the Quran and Sharia the "sole reference point for . . . ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community . . . and state." One of its key slogans is "Islam is the solution."
The organization's political involvement grew out of its agitation for an end to British colonial rule. The brotherhood supported a 1952 military coup that brought Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. But he outlawed the movement in 1954, jailing and killing hundreds of activists. Others fled, establishing branches abroad.
The movement moved underground. A leading member, Sayyid Qutb, is regarded as inspiring the founding of al-Qaida and other radical groups by advocating the establishment of Islamic rule through jihad. Qutb was accused of trying to overthrow the government and hanged in 1966.
The mainstream movement re-emerged in the 1980s, seeking to join the political mainstream. It built a large following by providing social services and appealing to the religious sentiments of Egypt's conservative Muslim-dominated population.
It won an unprecedented 88 seats in Parliament in 2005 by having its candidates run as independents. During the 2010 election campaign, the regime cracked down so severely on the movement that it boycotted the vote.
—Omar Suleiman
Born in the impoverished Upper Egypt governate of Qena in 1936, Mubarak's former intelligence chief was appointed first vice president last weekend.
Not much is known about Suleiman, 75, who kept a low profile in line with his previous post as intelligence czar, a go-between Israel and Palestinians who was close to the U.S. and Mubarak's most trusted adviser and troubleshooter.
Some experts suggest that he could lead a transitional government. But many protesters have rejected that idea, chanting that he, too, should leave office.
Stephen P. Cohen, a U.S. scholar who has served as an intermediary between Arab and Israeli leaders and has known Suleiman for years, said Suleiman has no interest in taking over from Mubarak.
"He sees his main responsibility now to make sure that there is no confrontation between the military and the people," said Cohen, the head of the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development. "That he considers a disastrous outcome that would challenge the very nature of the state."
Suleiman, who's fluent in English, is said to be brilliant, urbane and well-read.
But as head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, or EGIS, he's closely identified with the abuses meted out to Mubarak's opponents. He also worked closely with the CIA on renditions of al-Qaida operatives, including one who was tortured in Egyptian custody.
Suleiman entered the Military Academy in 1954 and served as an army officer during the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel. He rose to become deputy chief of military intelligence in 1986.
In frequent contact with Mubarak, he was elevated to EGIS director in 1993, a post in which he directed a harsh clampdown on Islamic extremists.
He reportedly sealed his position of trust with Mubarak by insisting on having an armored car flown into Ethiopia for a 1995 visit there by the Egyptian strongman. The vehicle saved the pair from an ambush by Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa.
—Ayman Nour
Nour, a lawyer and a former member of Parliament, is the founder of the opposition al Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. He ran a distant second to Mubarak in the country's first multi-candidate presidential election in 2006.
The following year, Nour was jailed and spent more than three years behind bars on disputed charges that he used forged signatures to start his party. He suffered ill-health while in jail and the Bush administration repeatedly called for his release, infuriating Mubarak.
While Nour, 46, was in jail, his party split into factions and its headquarters caught fire.
After his release, Nour resumed his opposition activities and regularly attended anti-Mubarak demonstrations.
Nour was a founder of the National Association for Change, the informal movement of secular and Islamic opposition groups pressing for constitutional changes that would allow ElBaradei to run for president this year.
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