2 incredible stories on the NY News tonight.
First, a young man (about 15 years old) heard a rustling sound in an enormous dumpster in Queens.
For those not here, it is currently in the teens in NY, with gale force winds.
The boy climbed onto the dumpster and looked into a paper bag. He saw a newborn baby, so young that the umbilical chord was still attached.
Thank g*d, the baby is doing well, but can you imagine what kind of mind, and situation could leave a newborn in a dumpster, in this weather!
The second story occurred in New Jersey.
Governor John Corzine signed a bill outlawing the death penalty in the state.
It means that those on death row, currently 8 inmates, have had their sentences commuted.
Polls show that the majority of New Jerseyite's (ine's?) do NOT support the bill.
But, among those whose sentences were commuted was Jesse Timmendequas the rapist and murderer of Megan Kanka.
The name may be familiar to those who don't remember the case for the law that was named after Megan. Megan's law requires sexual offenders to register their locations with the police.
Timmendquas was a repeat violent sexual offender who kidnapped, raped and murdered 6 year old Megan and was sentenced to death.
The irony of the situation, is that with the way prisons deal with child murderers, he may now go from the relative safety of his death row cell (no inmate has been executed in NJ in many decades) to the general prison population where he will be hunted by other prisoners.
Monday, December 17, 2007
640:1 (Thanks to the Harvard Crimson)
How Much Land is Enough?
Ruth R. Wisse - Dec 03, 2007
The Harvard Crimson
Before you begin reading this, please have before you on screen, paper, or wall, a reliable full-scale map of the Middle East, one stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan, from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf of Aden. You will note that the territory covering 5.25 million miles belongs to states of the Arab League—18 independent Arab states and three part-Arab Muslim states, Mauritania, Somalia, and Djibouti. There is one holdout in that hegemony: Along the Mediterranean, south of Lebanon, east of Egypt, and west of Jordan, is the 8,000 square mile Jewish state of Israel—the only Jewish homeland that ever was and ever will be.
The population of Israel, 7 million, is 20 percent Arab. The ratio of Arab to Jewish land is 640:1. If I were an Arab Muslim in, say, Saudi Arabia (830,000 square miles, population 23 million) with its wealth of oil fields along the Persian Gulf, I might wonder why Jews, who blend ethnicity and religion just as Arab Muslims do, should claim so little land when we cover so much. Why does my country house two holy cities—Mecca and Medina—whereas Jews claim but one—Jerusalem, site of the Temple of Solomon and Herod? What accounts for the astonishing disparity between how much land the Arabs got in history and how little was left to Jews?
Were I a Palestinian Arab citizen of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (34, 495 square miles, population 5.8 million), with its magnificent city of Petra, I would wonder why we didn't federate with the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank when that territory was in our possession until 1967? Why didn't we settle our refugees as the Jews did theirs in a territory one quarter the size of ours? Since the number of Arab refugees from Israel equaled the number of refugee Jews fleeing Arab lands, why didn't we accept this population exchange? Why did we join the Arab wars on Israel with the aim of driving the Jews into the sea?
As an Arab in Egypt (386,874 square miles, population 74 million), I'd be troubled by the Arab movies I saw on television, one charging the Jews with world conspiracy, the other showing a cabal of Orthodox Jews slitting the throat of an Arab boy, pouring his blood into a basin, and making Passover matzah that they boast tastes much better than the ordinary kind. Why does our media repeat and recreate these anti-Semitic images, even as we object to anything that touches Muslim honor? Why are we fed this scummy hatred of Jews instead of being encouraged to visit Israel and to study Hebrew?
And then there's Iran, not Arab but Muslim, hence not included in the above statistic (613,660 square miles, population over 65 million). Why does our leader rant at the Jews—"There was no Holocaust!" "There will be no Israel!" —when no Jew ever raised a hand against him? What purpose is served by this posturing against a country and a people so much smaller than ours? And why can't we Muslims can't solve our own rivalries instead of ganging up on a country/that functions fairly well?
Not being an Arab or a Muslim, I can only wonder why students raised in those societies do not ask these questions, encouraging their governments to change their policies. More than that, I marvel at the fact that some of my colleagues apparently share the assumption that Arab and Muslim leaders are entitled to over one-tenth of the world's land surface, while questioning the right of Jews to land about one-ninth the size of Syria. Do they really believe that Arabs and Muslims are innately so much worthier than Jews?
Much has changed in the Middle East during the past six decades, but one political feature remains disturbingly constant. The Arab League formed in 1945 to prevent the emergence of Israel, launching the most lop-sided war in human history, a war that continues hot and cold to the present day, pitting multiple non- and anti-democratic regimes against the Jewish State.Israel and the Jews became a means of deflecting attention from the mounting failings and weaknesses of those regimes, very much the way that scapegoating the Jews served some Christian and anti-Semitic rulers in their time. Arab leaders who sought peace with Israel, such as King Abdullah I of Jordan and Anwar Sadat of Egypt, were assassinated by rivals.
Religious and secular factions competed with one another over whose aggression against Israel was bloodier and more intimidating. Moreover, the war against Israel required the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to permanent refugee status, lest their productive redeployment mean (as Cairo radio put it in 1957) "the final disposal of a moral asset." The Arab world fueled its war against Israel with the permanent misery of Palestinian Arabs—and ascribed that misery to the "oppressor Jews" in a more perfect moral inversion than any literary Satan ever proposed.
Postmodernism adores moral inversions, which may be why some Harvard professors have so eagerly joined the "devil's party." But let's not get ahead of ourselves: Look again at the full-scale map. Keep it always within reach and often within sight. Don't let any course or discussion of the Middle East proceed except in its presence. And if the need arises, ask why Arabs and Muslims think they deserve odds greater than 640:1.
Ruth R. Wisse - Dec 03, 2007
The Harvard Crimson
Before you begin reading this, please have before you on screen, paper, or wall, a reliable full-scale map of the Middle East, one stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan, from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf of Aden. You will note that the territory covering 5.25 million miles belongs to states of the Arab League—18 independent Arab states and three part-Arab Muslim states, Mauritania, Somalia, and Djibouti. There is one holdout in that hegemony: Along the Mediterranean, south of Lebanon, east of Egypt, and west of Jordan, is the 8,000 square mile Jewish state of Israel—the only Jewish homeland that ever was and ever will be.
The population of Israel, 7 million, is 20 percent Arab. The ratio of Arab to Jewish land is 640:1. If I were an Arab Muslim in, say, Saudi Arabia (830,000 square miles, population 23 million) with its wealth of oil fields along the Persian Gulf, I might wonder why Jews, who blend ethnicity and religion just as Arab Muslims do, should claim so little land when we cover so much. Why does my country house two holy cities—Mecca and Medina—whereas Jews claim but one—Jerusalem, site of the Temple of Solomon and Herod? What accounts for the astonishing disparity between how much land the Arabs got in history and how little was left to Jews?
Were I a Palestinian Arab citizen of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (34, 495 square miles, population 5.8 million), with its magnificent city of Petra, I would wonder why we didn't federate with the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank when that territory was in our possession until 1967? Why didn't we settle our refugees as the Jews did theirs in a territory one quarter the size of ours? Since the number of Arab refugees from Israel equaled the number of refugee Jews fleeing Arab lands, why didn't we accept this population exchange? Why did we join the Arab wars on Israel with the aim of driving the Jews into the sea?
As an Arab in Egypt (386,874 square miles, population 74 million), I'd be troubled by the Arab movies I saw on television, one charging the Jews with world conspiracy, the other showing a cabal of Orthodox Jews slitting the throat of an Arab boy, pouring his blood into a basin, and making Passover matzah that they boast tastes much better than the ordinary kind. Why does our media repeat and recreate these anti-Semitic images, even as we object to anything that touches Muslim honor? Why are we fed this scummy hatred of Jews instead of being encouraged to visit Israel and to study Hebrew?
And then there's Iran, not Arab but Muslim, hence not included in the above statistic (613,660 square miles, population over 65 million). Why does our leader rant at the Jews—"There was no Holocaust!" "There will be no Israel!" —when no Jew ever raised a hand against him? What purpose is served by this posturing against a country and a people so much smaller than ours? And why can't we Muslims can't solve our own rivalries instead of ganging up on a country/that functions fairly well?
Not being an Arab or a Muslim, I can only wonder why students raised in those societies do not ask these questions, encouraging their governments to change their policies. More than that, I marvel at the fact that some of my colleagues apparently share the assumption that Arab and Muslim leaders are entitled to over one-tenth of the world's land surface, while questioning the right of Jews to land about one-ninth the size of Syria. Do they really believe that Arabs and Muslims are innately so much worthier than Jews?
Much has changed in the Middle East during the past six decades, but one political feature remains disturbingly constant. The Arab League formed in 1945 to prevent the emergence of Israel, launching the most lop-sided war in human history, a war that continues hot and cold to the present day, pitting multiple non- and anti-democratic regimes against the Jewish State.Israel and the Jews became a means of deflecting attention from the mounting failings and weaknesses of those regimes, very much the way that scapegoating the Jews served some Christian and anti-Semitic rulers in their time. Arab leaders who sought peace with Israel, such as King Abdullah I of Jordan and Anwar Sadat of Egypt, were assassinated by rivals.
Religious and secular factions competed with one another over whose aggression against Israel was bloodier and more intimidating. Moreover, the war against Israel required the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to permanent refugee status, lest their productive redeployment mean (as Cairo radio put it in 1957) "the final disposal of a moral asset." The Arab world fueled its war against Israel with the permanent misery of Palestinian Arabs—and ascribed that misery to the "oppressor Jews" in a more perfect moral inversion than any literary Satan ever proposed.
Postmodernism adores moral inversions, which may be why some Harvard professors have so eagerly joined the "devil's party." But let's not get ahead of ourselves: Look again at the full-scale map. Keep it always within reach and often within sight. Don't let any course or discussion of the Middle East proceed except in its presence. And if the need arises, ask why Arabs and Muslims think they deserve odds greater than 640:1.
Friday, December 14, 2007
Surprise! Dennis Ross agrees with me!
Dennis Ross, the special envoy to the Middle East for both the first President Bush and President Clinton agrees with me that whether or not the Iranians have halted their weapons program, the continued pursuit of fissionable material is the critical factor.
The Can't-Win Kids
The dunderheaded public roll-out of the NIE.
Dennis Ross, The New Republic Published: Tuesday, December 11, 2007
The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran presents an interesting paradox: Though almost certainly the product of rigorous assessment and questioning, it may actually leave us less secure over time. How can such an improved product of spycraft have such a negative effect? It can when it frames the issue mistakenly and is not combined with statecraft.
I don't question the assumptions or analysis in the NIE, or for that matter, its main conclusion. I accept that the Iranians suspended their covert
nuclear weapons program in 2003. But I am afraid that misses the point. Weaponizing is not the issue, developing fissionable materials is. Because compared with producing fissionable material, which makes up the core of nuclear bombs, weaponizing it is neither particularly difficult nor expensive.
In other words, the hard part of becoming a nuclear power is enriching uranium or separating out plutonium. And guess what? Iran is going
full-speed ahead on both. With over 3,300 operating centrifuges for spinning
uranium gases at its facility at Natanz (and more centrifuges on the way)and the building of a heavy water plant for plutonium separation at Arak, the Iranians will be able to master both by 2010 at the latest.
Perhaps that's why, in 2005, former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani told a visiting group of American experts, including George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment, that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons research. According to Perkovich, Rafsanjani said: "Look, as long as we can enrich
uranium and master the fuel cycle, we don't need anything else. Our neighbors will be able to draw the proper conclusions."
Maybe, as Rafsanjani was suggesting, the Iranians will be satisfied only to foster the appearance of having nuclear weapons without actually producing
them; for Rafsanjani, so long as Iran's neighbors assume it has nuclear weapons, they'll become responsive to Iran's wishes. But can we count on
Iran's maintaining such a posture indefinitely? And even if we could, what would the Middle East look like if Iran gained far greater coercive leverage over all its neighbors? Wouldn't oil production policies be used to separate
us from our allies or further manipulate the world's economy? Wouldn't we face a region increasingly hostile to our interests? Wouldn't we see the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace diminish as Iran worked to weaken, isolate, and demoralize the Jewish state? And to avoid being at the mercy of Iran, wouldn't the Saudis decide to go nuclear--and wouldn't that impel the Egyptians to do the same?
The point is that even the image of Iran as a nuclear power carries with it very dangerous consequences, including that the Middle East might become a nuclear-armed region. It is not an accident that the British, the French, and the Germans have sought to get the Iranians to stop their nuclear program. Similarly, it is not an accident that two U.N. Security Council
resolutions have imposed limited sanctions on Iran to get it to stop its enrichment efforts.
Consider the irony that the sanctions resolutions adopted by the Security Council were not about Iran's covert nuclear arms program. The Russians,
among others, have not believed that the Iranians had one. Instead, the international community in these resolutions was making it clear that it saw
Iran's enrichment program--and its rejection of offers of light water reactors for purely civil nuclear purposes--as indicators that Iran intended
to develop a nuclear weapons capability at some point.
While nothing theoretically has changed, the NIE has created a new story line. It framed the issue differently and shifted the attention away from
enrichment to the weapons program. Well, if the weapons program has been halted, can't we relax? Certainly, that is the conclusion that the Chinese
are drawing, given their mercantilist approach to Iran and foreign policy in general. They are now saying there is not a need for another sanctions
resolution against Iran. The Russians, too, are joining them, no doubt reflecting, at least in part, Putin's desire to demonstrate in the Middle
East and on the international stage that Russia is an alternative to America.
If nothing else, this means that it will be far harder to get an additional sanctions resolution in the UN any time soon. We could always seek to go outside the Security Council for sanctions. The European Union, Japan, and South Korea are all attractive options since they're far more important to Iran's economic well-being. But here again, the NIE has made that harder. None of the countries in Europe or Asia can appear to be tougher toward Iran than the United States, particularly given the highly negative perceptions
of the Bush administration in these places. It matters little that President Bush is still urging pressure on Iran--his intelligence agencies have
created the impression that Iran is not a near-term threat.
Once again, one sees irony. The subtext of the NIE is that the Iranian leadership makes its decisions on a "cost-benefit approach"--and that the nuclear weapons program "probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure." But the way the NIE has framed the issue, it will now be harder to apply the very pressure it concludes worked in 2003.
One can criticize the intelligence community for framing the NIE around the wrong issue, but the intelligence community was not responsible for the
public roll-out of its estimate. President Bush and those around him made the decision to publicize it--after all, NIEs are not typically publicized. No doubt, the president and his advisors understood that once the NIE was
briefed to the congressional oversight committees on the Hill that its findings would leak, and they wanted to get out in front of the leaks.
Fair enough. Unfortunately, their presentation was not only poor in terms of framing, but also because it blindsided our allies. The British, French, and Germans have led the diplomatic efforts at the U.N. and in the E.U. on Iran;
it was important for them not to be exposed on this issue since each country's population holds such grave doubts about anything the Bush Administration portrays as threat. How could we not go to them in advance of the release of the NIE, explain the key judgments, and work out a common public approach? Had there been such coordination on the public message, it is hard to believe that the public presentation of the findings would not have been better presented--leaving all of us better positioned today.
Sadly, it's now easier for Iran to proceed unimpeded with its nuclear plans. It is far less likely to face the economic (or potentially military) pressures that in 2003 might have persuaded those in the Iranian leadership that the costs of developing their nuclear capabilities were too high. Who in the Iranian elite will argue that or oppose Ahmadinejad's approach to nukes now? No doubt, that is not what the authors of the NIE sought, but here poor statecraft has trumped our improved efforts at spycraft.
The Can't-Win Kids
The dunderheaded public roll-out of the NIE.
Dennis Ross, The New Republic Published: Tuesday, December 11, 2007
The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran presents an interesting paradox: Though almost certainly the product of rigorous assessment and questioning, it may actually leave us less secure over time. How can such an improved product of spycraft have such a negative effect? It can when it frames the issue mistakenly and is not combined with statecraft.
I don't question the assumptions or analysis in the NIE, or for that matter, its main conclusion. I accept that the Iranians suspended their covert
nuclear weapons program in 2003. But I am afraid that misses the point. Weaponizing is not the issue, developing fissionable materials is. Because compared with producing fissionable material, which makes up the core of nuclear bombs, weaponizing it is neither particularly difficult nor expensive.
In other words, the hard part of becoming a nuclear power is enriching uranium or separating out plutonium. And guess what? Iran is going
full-speed ahead on both. With over 3,300 operating centrifuges for spinning
uranium gases at its facility at Natanz (and more centrifuges on the way)and the building of a heavy water plant for plutonium separation at Arak, the Iranians will be able to master both by 2010 at the latest.
Perhaps that's why, in 2005, former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani told a visiting group of American experts, including George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment, that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons research. According to Perkovich, Rafsanjani said: "Look, as long as we can enrich
uranium and master the fuel cycle, we don't need anything else. Our neighbors will be able to draw the proper conclusions."
Maybe, as Rafsanjani was suggesting, the Iranians will be satisfied only to foster the appearance of having nuclear weapons without actually producing
them; for Rafsanjani, so long as Iran's neighbors assume it has nuclear weapons, they'll become responsive to Iran's wishes. But can we count on
Iran's maintaining such a posture indefinitely? And even if we could, what would the Middle East look like if Iran gained far greater coercive leverage over all its neighbors? Wouldn't oil production policies be used to separate
us from our allies or further manipulate the world's economy? Wouldn't we face a region increasingly hostile to our interests? Wouldn't we see the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace diminish as Iran worked to weaken, isolate, and demoralize the Jewish state? And to avoid being at the mercy of Iran, wouldn't the Saudis decide to go nuclear--and wouldn't that impel the Egyptians to do the same?
The point is that even the image of Iran as a nuclear power carries with it very dangerous consequences, including that the Middle East might become a nuclear-armed region. It is not an accident that the British, the French, and the Germans have sought to get the Iranians to stop their nuclear program. Similarly, it is not an accident that two U.N. Security Council
resolutions have imposed limited sanctions on Iran to get it to stop its enrichment efforts.
Consider the irony that the sanctions resolutions adopted by the Security Council were not about Iran's covert nuclear arms program. The Russians,
among others, have not believed that the Iranians had one. Instead, the international community in these resolutions was making it clear that it saw
Iran's enrichment program--and its rejection of offers of light water reactors for purely civil nuclear purposes--as indicators that Iran intended
to develop a nuclear weapons capability at some point.
While nothing theoretically has changed, the NIE has created a new story line. It framed the issue differently and shifted the attention away from
enrichment to the weapons program. Well, if the weapons program has been halted, can't we relax? Certainly, that is the conclusion that the Chinese
are drawing, given their mercantilist approach to Iran and foreign policy in general. They are now saying there is not a need for another sanctions
resolution against Iran. The Russians, too, are joining them, no doubt reflecting, at least in part, Putin's desire to demonstrate in the Middle
East and on the international stage that Russia is an alternative to America.
If nothing else, this means that it will be far harder to get an additional sanctions resolution in the UN any time soon. We could always seek to go outside the Security Council for sanctions. The European Union, Japan, and South Korea are all attractive options since they're far more important to Iran's economic well-being. But here again, the NIE has made that harder. None of the countries in Europe or Asia can appear to be tougher toward Iran than the United States, particularly given the highly negative perceptions
of the Bush administration in these places. It matters little that President Bush is still urging pressure on Iran--his intelligence agencies have
created the impression that Iran is not a near-term threat.
Once again, one sees irony. The subtext of the NIE is that the Iranian leadership makes its decisions on a "cost-benefit approach"--and that the nuclear weapons program "probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure." But the way the NIE has framed the issue, it will now be harder to apply the very pressure it concludes worked in 2003.
One can criticize the intelligence community for framing the NIE around the wrong issue, but the intelligence community was not responsible for the
public roll-out of its estimate. President Bush and those around him made the decision to publicize it--after all, NIEs are not typically publicized. No doubt, the president and his advisors understood that once the NIE was
briefed to the congressional oversight committees on the Hill that its findings would leak, and they wanted to get out in front of the leaks.
Fair enough. Unfortunately, their presentation was not only poor in terms of framing, but also because it blindsided our allies. The British, French, and Germans have led the diplomatic efforts at the U.N. and in the E.U. on Iran;
it was important for them not to be exposed on this issue since each country's population holds such grave doubts about anything the Bush Administration portrays as threat. How could we not go to them in advance of the release of the NIE, explain the key judgments, and work out a common public approach? Had there been such coordination on the public message, it is hard to believe that the public presentation of the findings would not have been better presented--leaving all of us better positioned today.
Sadly, it's now easier for Iran to proceed unimpeded with its nuclear plans. It is far less likely to face the economic (or potentially military) pressures that in 2003 might have persuaded those in the Iranian leadership that the costs of developing their nuclear capabilities were too high. Who in the Iranian elite will argue that or oppose Ahmadinejad's approach to nukes now? No doubt, that is not what the authors of the NIE sought, but here poor statecraft has trumped our improved efforts at spycraft.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
The Mitchell Report
I am taking some time to digest the Mitchell Report before writing a full post.
However a few initial points.
First, please go back and read my previous posts The History of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sports.
First, Mitchell did try to correct one frequently cited mistake. He stated correctly that steroids have been illegal since 1971 and the controlled substances act. Use of a prescription medication for any purpose other than it's FDA approved usage is illegal.
Steroids are currently not approved for use in the United States for any purpose.
Hgh is ONLY legal for conditions of low growth hormone. Not injury rehab or anything else.
Second, the names. He also correctly stated that the names are simply the beginning.
However, the report itself will create a situation in which people think this is it.
As many of you will note in my previous posts on the issue of Drug use in sports, Roger Clememns stands out, and is an obvious user of HgH.
However, as I have pointed out repeatedly, their use is far more rampant, not just in baseball, but in all sports than anyone would like to believe.
For anyone working in the health and fitness field, it is quite simple to detect a Drug user.
Unfortunately, their use has become so ubiqitous, that most people no longer recognize them.
Steroids became prevalent in the 1950's and '60's.
Yes, 50 or sixty years ago.
Their use in baseball became obvious, not in the 1990's as Major League Baseball would have you believe, but in the late 1970's and 1980's. They were used during my time in the sport.
They became rampant in the late 1980's. People have forgotten the home run year of 1987. Formerly known as singles hitters, people like Brady Anderson of the Orioles, Lenny Dykstra, Juan Samuel, all became home run hitters.
Finally, what continues to be overlooked, is the ease in beating the tests.
Regardless of how often, how unannounced, or otherwise secure the tests are, as long as a ratio of 4 to 1 epitestosterone to testosterone is used (see my previous posts on the explanation of this) the tests will always be a joke.
However a few initial points.
First, please go back and read my previous posts The History of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sports.
First, Mitchell did try to correct one frequently cited mistake. He stated correctly that steroids have been illegal since 1971 and the controlled substances act. Use of a prescription medication for any purpose other than it's FDA approved usage is illegal.
Steroids are currently not approved for use in the United States for any purpose.
Hgh is ONLY legal for conditions of low growth hormone. Not injury rehab or anything else.
Second, the names. He also correctly stated that the names are simply the beginning.
However, the report itself will create a situation in which people think this is it.
As many of you will note in my previous posts on the issue of Drug use in sports, Roger Clememns stands out, and is an obvious user of HgH.
However, as I have pointed out repeatedly, their use is far more rampant, not just in baseball, but in all sports than anyone would like to believe.
For anyone working in the health and fitness field, it is quite simple to detect a Drug user.
Unfortunately, their use has become so ubiqitous, that most people no longer recognize them.
Steroids became prevalent in the 1950's and '60's.
Yes, 50 or sixty years ago.
Their use in baseball became obvious, not in the 1990's as Major League Baseball would have you believe, but in the late 1970's and 1980's. They were used during my time in the sport.
They became rampant in the late 1980's. People have forgotten the home run year of 1987. Formerly known as singles hitters, people like Brady Anderson of the Orioles, Lenny Dykstra, Juan Samuel, all became home run hitters.
Finally, what continues to be overlooked, is the ease in beating the tests.
Regardless of how often, how unannounced, or otherwise secure the tests are, as long as a ratio of 4 to 1 epitestosterone to testosterone is used (see my previous posts on the explanation of this) the tests will always be a joke.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Perhaps the most important post any of us will read any time soon
Those of you who read my blog regularly know that my attitude on the war in Iraq is one of "no matter how we got here, we have to deal with the current situation".
I have actually never explicitly stated my views on the war and it's origins, although I have made clear that anyone that belittles Sadaam's WMD programs, or his support of terrorism (not 9/11) just wasn't paying attention for two and a half decades.
The first and second intifada's in Israel were largely financed by Sadaam. He cut $10-25,000 checks to the families of suicide bombers. This was well known. That may not seem like a lot to you, but even in Israel, an annual income of $25K is fairly significant. In the territories, it is a small fortune.
In addition, every intelligence agency in the world, from the Russians to the British, Chinese, etc. all believed there was an active weapons program.
So, while I don't state my opinion on the war, I do believe the conversation is usually about the wrong things.
For that, I blame, largely, the American press.
Along those lines: One of my new readers, and a valued regular here in Blogland, is just back from serving in Iraq.
I asked him to write a piece for all of us. While I have spent quite a bit of time in what is known as the Levant, basically, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, I, like most Americans, have not been to Iraq.
chester4440 has. This is his piece, with no input from me. Whatever you think of the war, those who fight have my eternal respect and admiration, as they should yours. Please thank him for his service, and visit his blog.
Chester modestly titled his piece:
A grunt's eye view
I was stationed at Al-Taquaddum Air Base in Al-Anbar province. It is located near the town of Habbineah, between Ramadi and Fallujah. My company was a convoy escort company that provided armed escorts to logistics convoys of military and civilian contractor vehicles. These are my observations of my own small portion of the situation in the war in Iraq. These words are my own.
We were combating an enemy that I saw once in a year. And that was a group of five that the Marines were detaining after finding six AK47's a RPK light machine gun, a couple of RPG launchers and approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition in their vehicles. The insurgents blended almost perfectly with the civilian population from our perspective, and stayed close to the civilian population to negate the overwhelming firepower of the U.S. Military. They maintain their position in the civilian population mainly through intimidation and reprisal killings. The U.S. is slowly removing these cells, and the Iraqi government and civilian population is coming around to ending the insurgency.
There are many strategies that were working at the time I left. The surge helped by simply providing enough troops to deny the insurgents access to the countryside. A simple fact is that if there are more soldiers on the ground you can spend more time going through an area. This also provided enough time to properly train Iraqi police and military. as we witnessed in 1991 and 2003, yes they really were that bad. The Iraqis are now capable of holding areas that the U.S. clears. The Iraqi people and the Sheiks who lead them have determined that the insurgents have had the tide turn against them and have decided to back the U.S. and Iraqi forces. An example of this was early this summer when the Sheiks of Al-Anbar declared their support.
I have a first hand knowledge that, despite what the news says, despite what the politicians say, things are improving in Iraq. To prove this i will use a simple grunts yardstick. When we first arrived we were being mortared on average every ten days and were finding IED's five miles from the gate of our camp. When we left we hadn't been mortared for months and Had to go almost to Baghdad to find IED's with any regularity. Iraq will never be a Jeffersonian democracy in my opinion. It is just too different of culture. But we cannot abandon it to fall apart either. These are my observations and beliefs. You may agree or disagree but either way you may sleep safe at night knowing that me and people like me are willing to give our lives to defend your right to do either.
Chester,out
I have actually never explicitly stated my views on the war and it's origins, although I have made clear that anyone that belittles Sadaam's WMD programs, or his support of terrorism (not 9/11) just wasn't paying attention for two and a half decades.
The first and second intifada's in Israel were largely financed by Sadaam. He cut $10-25,000 checks to the families of suicide bombers. This was well known. That may not seem like a lot to you, but even in Israel, an annual income of $25K is fairly significant. In the territories, it is a small fortune.
In addition, every intelligence agency in the world, from the Russians to the British, Chinese, etc. all believed there was an active weapons program.
So, while I don't state my opinion on the war, I do believe the conversation is usually about the wrong things.
For that, I blame, largely, the American press.
Along those lines: One of my new readers, and a valued regular here in Blogland, is just back from serving in Iraq.
I asked him to write a piece for all of us. While I have spent quite a bit of time in what is known as the Levant, basically, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, I, like most Americans, have not been to Iraq.
chester4440 has. This is his piece, with no input from me. Whatever you think of the war, those who fight have my eternal respect and admiration, as they should yours. Please thank him for his service, and visit his blog.
Chester modestly titled his piece:
A grunt's eye view
I was stationed at Al-Taquaddum Air Base in Al-Anbar province. It is located near the town of Habbineah, between Ramadi and Fallujah. My company was a convoy escort company that provided armed escorts to logistics convoys of military and civilian contractor vehicles. These are my observations of my own small portion of the situation in the war in Iraq. These words are my own.
We were combating an enemy that I saw once in a year. And that was a group of five that the Marines were detaining after finding six AK47's a RPK light machine gun, a couple of RPG launchers and approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition in their vehicles. The insurgents blended almost perfectly with the civilian population from our perspective, and stayed close to the civilian population to negate the overwhelming firepower of the U.S. Military. They maintain their position in the civilian population mainly through intimidation and reprisal killings. The U.S. is slowly removing these cells, and the Iraqi government and civilian population is coming around to ending the insurgency.
There are many strategies that were working at the time I left. The surge helped by simply providing enough troops to deny the insurgents access to the countryside. A simple fact is that if there are more soldiers on the ground you can spend more time going through an area. This also provided enough time to properly train Iraqi police and military. as we witnessed in 1991 and 2003, yes they really were that bad. The Iraqis are now capable of holding areas that the U.S. clears. The Iraqi people and the Sheiks who lead them have determined that the insurgents have had the tide turn against them and have decided to back the U.S. and Iraqi forces. An example of this was early this summer when the Sheiks of Al-Anbar declared their support.
I have a first hand knowledge that, despite what the news says, despite what the politicians say, things are improving in Iraq. To prove this i will use a simple grunts yardstick. When we first arrived we were being mortared on average every ten days and were finding IED's five miles from the gate of our camp. When we left we hadn't been mortared for months and Had to go almost to Baghdad to find IED's with any regularity. Iraq will never be a Jeffersonian democracy in my opinion. It is just too different of culture. But we cannot abandon it to fall apart either. These are my observations and beliefs. You may agree or disagree but either way you may sleep safe at night knowing that me and people like me are willing to give our lives to defend your right to do either.
Chester,out
Friday, December 7, 2007
The New Republic (and Israel) on the National Intelligence Estimate
As I wrote in an earlier post, the press has focused on basically one line from the National Intelligence Estimate with regard to Iran's plans.
The estimate claims new intelligence, conversations between several high ranking generals in Iran, discussing the suspension of a nuclear warhead program.
***Please note, this does not mean a suspension of the missile programs, or the nuclear program***
TO me, the significant factor is the recognition that Iran continues it's pursuit of enriched uranium, with yellow cake. A process used principally in the production of nuclear weapons, not energy.
With the missile technology, once the Iranians begin to approach sufficient levels of enrichment, the production of nuclear warheads is a matter of days. So, whether or not the program is currently suspended is irrelevant. Even if they had the warheads, they don't have the nuclear capability yet to produce nuclear weapons.
What follows is a piece from the New Republic by Yossi Klein Halevi on the Israeli view of the issue.
An Insult to Intelligence
The Israeli defense community responds to the NIE.
Yossi Klein Halevi, The New Republic Published: Thursday, December 06,
2007
Since the early 1990s, when Israel first began preparing for a possible military strike against Iran's nuclear program, its security establishment has been divided not about the threat Iran posed--which was almost universally agreed upon to be grave--but about whether America and the international community would have the will to stop Tehran. Optimists noted the near-total Western acceptance of the Israeli intelligence assessment that the goal of the Iranian nuclear program was a bomb. In the last year, they have also pointed to the growing strength of the American-led sanctions effort, along with repeated warnings by American, French, and British leaders about a possible military strike if sanctions failed. The pessimists, for their part, insisted that the sanctions were too little too late, that America was in the grip of a new Vietnam-like trauma in Iraq, and that the mullahs' will to attain the bomb was stronger than the West's resolve to stop them.
Now, with the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, the argument apparently has been resolved. If sanctions fail to stop Iran from achieving the potential to produce nuclear weapons, the dirty work will be left to Israel, just as it was left to Israel to stop Saddam Hussein from going nuclear. America, even under George Bush, is hardly likely to go to war to stop a program many Americans now believe doesn't exist.
Until now, pessimists here could console themselves that a last-resort Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would likely draw wide international sympathy and even gratitude--very different from the near-total condemnation that greeted Israel's attack on Saddam's reactor in 1981. Now, though, the NIE will ensure that if Israel does attack, it will be widely branded a warmonger, and faulted for the inevitable fallout of rising oil prices and increased terror.
The sense of betrayal within the Israeli security system is deep. After all, Israel's great achievement in its struggle against Iran was in convincing the international community that the nuclear threat was real; now that victory has been undone--not by Russia or the European Union, but by Israel's closest ally.
[B]What makes Israeli security officials especially furious is that the report casts doubt on Iranian determination to attain nuclear weapons. There is a sense of incredulity here: Do we really need to argue the urgency of the threat all over again? The Israeli strategists I heard from ridicule the report's contention that "Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs." Is it, asks one Israeli analyst sarcastically, a cost-benefit approach for one of the world's largest oil exporters to risk international sanctions and economic ruin for the sake of a peaceful nuclear program?[/B]
No one with whom I've spoken believes that professional considerations, such as new intelligence, were decisive in changing the American assessment on Iran. What has been widely hailed in the American media as an expression of
intelligence sobriety, even courage, is seen in the Israeli strategic community as precisely the opposite: an expression of political machination and cowardice. "The Americans often accuse us of tailoring our intelligence to suit our political needs," notes a former top security official. "But isn't this report a case study of doing precisely that?"
Adds a key security analyst: "The report didn't surprise me. The [American intelligence] system isn't healthy. It has been thoroughly politicized. I saw it when I brought hard evidence to them through the 1990s about how the Palestinian Authority was violating its commitments. Their responses weren't professional but political. This report only deepens the crisis of confidence we feel."
The debate over the report within the Israeli security network is whether the motive of its sponsors was ideological or opportunistic. Was the NIE a back-handed way of implementing the Baker-Hamilton report, which called for engagement with Iran? Or, ore simply, was the NIE motivated by fear among intelligence analysts not to be caught exaggerating another WMD crisis?
Ironically, an Israeli reading of the report only confirms the anxiety here, felt across the political spectrum, about Iranian intentions and capabilities. Responding to the NIE, the left-wing newspaper, Haaretz, sounds like a neo-con organ: "While Iran continues threatening to annihilate Israel, what American intelligence thinks about Iran's nuclear capability is irrelevant.... The report establishes that if Iran wants to produce a bomb it can do so, and if it doesn't want to, it won't. This evaluation may have a restraining effect in internal American politics. But in Israeli politics it should cause the opposite reaction."
After all, the NIE affirms not only that attaining nuclear weapons remains a central goal within the Iranian leadership, but also that, by continuing to enrich uranium, Iran has maintained efforts to make that goal achievable.
For Israeli security analysts, the suspension in 2003 of Iran's covert nuclear military program--the NIE's defining issue--is hardly pivotal. Partly that's because the working assumption in Israeli intelligence is that the Iranians have resumed their covert military program. "The Syrians were working on their nuclear project for seven years, and we discovered it only recently," says one security analyst. "The Americans didn't know about it all. So how can they be so sure about Iran?"
The more compelling reason, though, for minimizing the significance of a suspension of the covert military program is that the program itself is of secondary importance at this stage in the development of an Iranian bomb. The Iranians have continued to vigorously pursue two other programs--uranium enrichment and missile delivery systems--whose success would ensure them relatively quick access to military capability, even without a weapons program already in place. Says Shabtai Shavit, former head of the Mossad: "My assessment is that, after they decided to aim for nuclear weapons, they advanced on three parallel tracks: enriching uranium, creating components for a bomb, and developing missiles. The missiles are ready for operation. As for enrichment, they have encountered all kinds of problems, like exploding centrifuges. I estimate that they made great progress, and very quickly, on the military track. Since they have problems with the uranium enrichment track, they can allow themselves to delay the military track, and wait for progress with uranium." Given that world attention has been focused on the military track, a tactical Iranian concession made sense.
Shavit notes that the problem with the NIE isn't in its facts but its deliberate ambiguity. "The whole report is filled with assessments of 'high probability,' 'middle probability,' 'low probability.' I don't need that." And if he had written the report? "I would have based my assessment on the facts and said unequivocally that Iran is going to create the ability to make a bomb."
Nor do senior analysts here take seriously the NIE's vague assessments of when Iran will reach the point of no return: beginning in 2010, it says, though not likely until 2013 or even 2015. Israel's point of no return is when Iran attains the potential to produce sufficient fissile material for making a bomb. And they believe that is likely to happen--barring continued mishaps, accidental or not, in the Iranian nuclear program, like exploding centrifuges--somewhere within the next two years.
Once the material is available, the final step toward constructing a bomb is the least complicated part of the process. "Making bombs is a much shorter process than uranium enrichment," explains Ephraim Asculai, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and a 40-year veteran of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. "Today the Iranians are enriching uranium at four percent; to make a bomb, you need 90 percent. From there, the transition doesn't require a lot of time. Most of the work has been done to get to the four percent. It is a matter of months, not years."
That sense of urgency is evident in the highest ranks of the Israeli military. A recent letter circulated by Eliezer Shkedi, commander of the Israeli Air Force, to his officers offered a textual comparison between quotes from Hitler threatening Europe's Jews in the 1930s with quotes from Iranian President Ahmadinejad threatening Israel today. An accompanying letter, signed by an officer identified only as "responsible for the Iranian arena," noted laconically, "We can rely only on ourselves." With the release of the NIE, that old Israeli sentiment has become far more acute.
The estimate claims new intelligence, conversations between several high ranking generals in Iran, discussing the suspension of a nuclear warhead program.
***Please note, this does not mean a suspension of the missile programs, or the nuclear program***
TO me, the significant factor is the recognition that Iran continues it's pursuit of enriched uranium, with yellow cake. A process used principally in the production of nuclear weapons, not energy.
With the missile technology, once the Iranians begin to approach sufficient levels of enrichment, the production of nuclear warheads is a matter of days. So, whether or not the program is currently suspended is irrelevant. Even if they had the warheads, they don't have the nuclear capability yet to produce nuclear weapons.
What follows is a piece from the New Republic by Yossi Klein Halevi on the Israeli view of the issue.
An Insult to Intelligence
The Israeli defense community responds to the NIE.
Yossi Klein Halevi, The New Republic Published: Thursday, December 06,
2007
Since the early 1990s, when Israel first began preparing for a possible military strike against Iran's nuclear program, its security establishment has been divided not about the threat Iran posed--which was almost universally agreed upon to be grave--but about whether America and the international community would have the will to stop Tehran. Optimists noted the near-total Western acceptance of the Israeli intelligence assessment that the goal of the Iranian nuclear program was a bomb. In the last year, they have also pointed to the growing strength of the American-led sanctions effort, along with repeated warnings by American, French, and British leaders about a possible military strike if sanctions failed. The pessimists, for their part, insisted that the sanctions were too little too late, that America was in the grip of a new Vietnam-like trauma in Iraq, and that the mullahs' will to attain the bomb was stronger than the West's resolve to stop them.
Now, with the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, the argument apparently has been resolved. If sanctions fail to stop Iran from achieving the potential to produce nuclear weapons, the dirty work will be left to Israel, just as it was left to Israel to stop Saddam Hussein from going nuclear. America, even under George Bush, is hardly likely to go to war to stop a program many Americans now believe doesn't exist.
Until now, pessimists here could console themselves that a last-resort Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would likely draw wide international sympathy and even gratitude--very different from the near-total condemnation that greeted Israel's attack on Saddam's reactor in 1981. Now, though, the NIE will ensure that if Israel does attack, it will be widely branded a warmonger, and faulted for the inevitable fallout of rising oil prices and increased terror.
The sense of betrayal within the Israeli security system is deep. After all, Israel's great achievement in its struggle against Iran was in convincing the international community that the nuclear threat was real; now that victory has been undone--not by Russia or the European Union, but by Israel's closest ally.
[B]What makes Israeli security officials especially furious is that the report casts doubt on Iranian determination to attain nuclear weapons. There is a sense of incredulity here: Do we really need to argue the urgency of the threat all over again? The Israeli strategists I heard from ridicule the report's contention that "Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs." Is it, asks one Israeli analyst sarcastically, a cost-benefit approach for one of the world's largest oil exporters to risk international sanctions and economic ruin for the sake of a peaceful nuclear program?[/B]
No one with whom I've spoken believes that professional considerations, such as new intelligence, were decisive in changing the American assessment on Iran. What has been widely hailed in the American media as an expression of
intelligence sobriety, even courage, is seen in the Israeli strategic community as precisely the opposite: an expression of political machination and cowardice. "The Americans often accuse us of tailoring our intelligence to suit our political needs," notes a former top security official. "But isn't this report a case study of doing precisely that?"
Adds a key security analyst: "The report didn't surprise me. The [American intelligence] system isn't healthy. It has been thoroughly politicized. I saw it when I brought hard evidence to them through the 1990s about how the Palestinian Authority was violating its commitments. Their responses weren't professional but political. This report only deepens the crisis of confidence we feel."
The debate over the report within the Israeli security network is whether the motive of its sponsors was ideological or opportunistic. Was the NIE a back-handed way of implementing the Baker-Hamilton report, which called for engagement with Iran? Or, ore simply, was the NIE motivated by fear among intelligence analysts not to be caught exaggerating another WMD crisis?
Ironically, an Israeli reading of the report only confirms the anxiety here, felt across the political spectrum, about Iranian intentions and capabilities. Responding to the NIE, the left-wing newspaper, Haaretz, sounds like a neo-con organ: "While Iran continues threatening to annihilate Israel, what American intelligence thinks about Iran's nuclear capability is irrelevant.... The report establishes that if Iran wants to produce a bomb it can do so, and if it doesn't want to, it won't. This evaluation may have a restraining effect in internal American politics. But in Israeli politics it should cause the opposite reaction."
After all, the NIE affirms not only that attaining nuclear weapons remains a central goal within the Iranian leadership, but also that, by continuing to enrich uranium, Iran has maintained efforts to make that goal achievable.
For Israeli security analysts, the suspension in 2003 of Iran's covert nuclear military program--the NIE's defining issue--is hardly pivotal. Partly that's because the working assumption in Israeli intelligence is that the Iranians have resumed their covert military program. "The Syrians were working on their nuclear project for seven years, and we discovered it only recently," says one security analyst. "The Americans didn't know about it all. So how can they be so sure about Iran?"
The more compelling reason, though, for minimizing the significance of a suspension of the covert military program is that the program itself is of secondary importance at this stage in the development of an Iranian bomb. The Iranians have continued to vigorously pursue two other programs--uranium enrichment and missile delivery systems--whose success would ensure them relatively quick access to military capability, even without a weapons program already in place. Says Shabtai Shavit, former head of the Mossad: "My assessment is that, after they decided to aim for nuclear weapons, they advanced on three parallel tracks: enriching uranium, creating components for a bomb, and developing missiles. The missiles are ready for operation. As for enrichment, they have encountered all kinds of problems, like exploding centrifuges. I estimate that they made great progress, and very quickly, on the military track. Since they have problems with the uranium enrichment track, they can allow themselves to delay the military track, and wait for progress with uranium." Given that world attention has been focused on the military track, a tactical Iranian concession made sense.
Shavit notes that the problem with the NIE isn't in its facts but its deliberate ambiguity. "The whole report is filled with assessments of 'high probability,' 'middle probability,' 'low probability.' I don't need that." And if he had written the report? "I would have based my assessment on the facts and said unequivocally that Iran is going to create the ability to make a bomb."
Nor do senior analysts here take seriously the NIE's vague assessments of when Iran will reach the point of no return: beginning in 2010, it says, though not likely until 2013 or even 2015. Israel's point of no return is when Iran attains the potential to produce sufficient fissile material for making a bomb. And they believe that is likely to happen--barring continued mishaps, accidental or not, in the Iranian nuclear program, like exploding centrifuges--somewhere within the next two years.
Once the material is available, the final step toward constructing a bomb is the least complicated part of the process. "Making bombs is a much shorter process than uranium enrichment," explains Ephraim Asculai, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and a 40-year veteran of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. "Today the Iranians are enriching uranium at four percent; to make a bomb, you need 90 percent. From there, the transition doesn't require a lot of time. Most of the work has been done to get to the four percent. It is a matter of months, not years."
That sense of urgency is evident in the highest ranks of the Israeli military. A recent letter circulated by Eliezer Shkedi, commander of the Israeli Air Force, to his officers offered a textual comparison between quotes from Hitler threatening Europe's Jews in the 1930s with quotes from Iranian President Ahmadinejad threatening Israel today. An accompanying letter, signed by an officer identified only as "responsible for the Iranian arena," noted laconically, "We can rely only on ourselves." With the release of the NIE, that old Israeli sentiment has become far more acute.
Wednesday, December 5, 2007
N.I.E. and Iran - can you see the smoke?
So the National Intelligence Estimate released this week claims that Iran gave up it's weapons program 4 years ago.
Or so said the headlines.
Critics, of course, claim this is just another example of the Bush administrations misuse of intelligence in prep for war against Iran.
There are several problems with this scenario.
First, there were no plans for military action, or at least invasion, of Iran.
At most, the only discussion centered on air strikes to take out the Iranian nukes.
But that is for another time.
What does the N.I.E. really say?
Well, most significantly, it states that the Iranian enrichment program is steaming full speed ahead.
As those who understand, know. The critical component to a nuclear warhead is not the missile technology, but rather the gathering of sufficient fissile material for the warhead.
The method of enrichment that the Iranians are using is most commonly used for producing nuclear weapons.
In addition, the improvement and production of their ballistic missiles continues unabated.
Their hardening of the missile silos also continues.
Finally, it is acknowledged that they purchased the plans for a nuclear weapon from the rogue Pakistani nuclear arms dealer A.Q. Khan.
What does it take to produce the final weapon? About 5 minutes and the turning of the final screw.
Observations of military activity, discussions of pre emption on the part of the Iranians and their own descriptions of acceptable losses in nuclear exchanges continue to point out the inevitability of their entering the nuclear weapons community.
This horse is out of the barn. What needs to be discussed is how to deal with a nuclear Iran, not whether they will be nuclear.
Or so said the headlines.
Critics, of course, claim this is just another example of the Bush administrations misuse of intelligence in prep for war against Iran.
There are several problems with this scenario.
First, there were no plans for military action, or at least invasion, of Iran.
At most, the only discussion centered on air strikes to take out the Iranian nukes.
But that is for another time.
What does the N.I.E. really say?
Well, most significantly, it states that the Iranian enrichment program is steaming full speed ahead.
As those who understand, know. The critical component to a nuclear warhead is not the missile technology, but rather the gathering of sufficient fissile material for the warhead.
The method of enrichment that the Iranians are using is most commonly used for producing nuclear weapons.
In addition, the improvement and production of their ballistic missiles continues unabated.
Their hardening of the missile silos also continues.
Finally, it is acknowledged that they purchased the plans for a nuclear weapon from the rogue Pakistani nuclear arms dealer A.Q. Khan.
What does it take to produce the final weapon? About 5 minutes and the turning of the final screw.
Observations of military activity, discussions of pre emption on the part of the Iranians and their own descriptions of acceptable losses in nuclear exchanges continue to point out the inevitability of their entering the nuclear weapons community.
This horse is out of the barn. What needs to be discussed is how to deal with a nuclear Iran, not whether they will be nuclear.
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Gulliver's Travels.... or My Brush with Death or... My Repeat with the TSA
I love to fly. Flat out. I will take any excuse to do so. I am not a frequent a flyer as those that do so for business, but my passport is full.
This weekend of course, I had the best excuse I could ever have and I was one motivated m'er f'er to get on a plane.
However, divorce, changing my life plans and prepping to once again become a student means I have to do it on the cheap.
So, this weekend it meant driving 160 miles to Atlantic City to catch the flight that gave me the sale price that meant flying 1000 miles would be roughly one third the cost of driving that 160 miles to the airport.
So, my flight left at 7:55am. Which meant boarding at 7:25.
Which of course, means a normal person would leave about 3 am to catch the flight.
But I drive FAST. So, I left at 4:30. Just in time for the first serious snow storm of the year.
But the flight down was fun, and I had a wonderful 2 days (despite my friend being sure I didn't!!). In fact, for much of the time I was feeling as relaxed and happy as I have been in quite some time.
So here's the rub. On the way home events started to unfold like a bad Macaulay Culkin movie. I ended up being dropped off at the airport about 8 hours before my scheduled departure.
OK, no prob. I'll read, do some work on the computer, etc. As it turned out though, I was still so exhausted from my early morning the previous day I really couldn't, but still everything was hunky dory.
Then, I hit security.
Yes, you remember my last post about airport security.
Now, it's not that I think the TSA is incompetent but follow this one.
For some reason, despite never having been stopped for my shaving kit, when I was asked (for the first time mind you) if I had any "liquids or creams in containers greater than 3 ounces", I stupidly answered in the affirmative.
So, I was made to remove them.
With a look of disgust, the TSA officer took my 3 oz tube of crest, Palmer's cocoa butter moisturizer and The Body Shop Shave cream, and put it in a dish.
He then proceeded to tell me that I could not go through screening area with these.
Why? I inquired. "That is SOP".
"Explain" queried I, the weary traveler, now a mere 5 1/2 hours early for my flight, but anxiously watching the time tick away.
"Those are the rules" replied my helpful friend, who I had begun to refer to as Shakespeare b/c of his deadpan wit and way with the English language.
Suddenly, the dreaded "supervisor" appeared. Shakespeare told the boss that I had a problem with the "SOP".
I quickly stated that I had no problem with it, despite my experience with the Secret Service, Mossad and other various agencies around the world and the fact that these little tubes of personal products, happily volunteered, were highly unlikely to be the tools of terrorists, particularly in the destination where the conversation was taking place.
"I only have a problem with the fact that I went through this same line 2 weeks ago with the same items, that I did not voluntarily produce, and no one said anything or stopped me". "I would just like to know why, Mr. Supervisor?"
"SOP" replied Shakespeare's literary muse.
"You have to place these items in a 1/2 quart or smaller, resealable, see through plastic bag."
My frustration reaching a boiling point, I put my shoes back on, packed the laptop up and jammed it into my overstuffed briefcase, put the wallet in the left pocket, keys in the right, change in the back right, replaced my watch carefully on my left wrist, closed my overnighter, careful not to let my liquids come in contact with each other for fear of the inevitable explosion (caught you!!), slung my fleece jacket over the briefcase shoulder strap and lifted my bag before trundling off to find a baggie.
Oh wait, forgot to put my shoes back on. The ones that were purchased specifically so that I would not have to remove them at the airport security check. Everything went down on the floor, the shoes were put back on, and the waltz began again.
Well, I hunted down the rare, and quickly disappearing, clear plastic baggie.
Carefully ripped off 99% of it - that's right - it was a 50 gallon garbage bag that the kindly porter in the coffee shop provided to me - tied off the top and proceeded to once again meet the Bard.
So, the repeat performance began.
It seemed my "baggie" did not Federal standards for clear plastic baggie reseal-ability. Apparently my hastily hog tied top of the 55 galloner, did not qualify on the carefully codified section of the Transportation Administrations lengthy treatise on the Federal guidelines on ziploc and other qualifying brands of reusable, non bomb making thermo plastic storage devices.
"Why?" I rudely inquired yet again. No real security cares about Crest toothpaste.
"Because we have to be able to see what you have in the bag".
The screeching of wheels stopping could be heard for miles.
"Excuse me? You mean you have to be able to see the objects that you are currently holding in your hand,... but inside a plastic bag?"
"That's right"
"So is there some magic bomb diffusing characteristics of the ziploc bag that we mere mortals do not grasp?"
That one, he didn't appreciate!!
So, once again I put my shoes back on, packed the laptop up and jammed it into my overstuffed briefcase, put the wallet in the left pocket, keys in the right, change in the back right, replaced my watch carefully on my left wrist, closed my overnighter, careful not to let my liquids come in contact with each other for fear of the inevitable explosion (caught you!!), slung my fleece jacket over the briefcase shoulder strap and lifted my bag before trundling off to find a true baggie but with the unique ability to reseal the fissile material contained within.
Thankfully, the kindly old lady at the information booth just happened to have a box of ziploc bagggies for those of us not up to snuff of the TSA guidelines on transporting deadly explosives.
So, once again, I proceeded through the security check.
Should I tell you that now, on the third time through the x ray machine in under 20 minutes they decided that my briefcase was "suspicious". And that it needed to be wiped down and analyzed with those handi wipes masquerading as mysterious bomb wiping tissues they use?
No, we'll save that for later.
So up the escalator I proceeded, after having once again, redressed myself, picked up my items, packed everything away and issued a final harumph.
I enter that privileged lair that only those lucky enough to have actually purchased a $13 ticket to Atlantic City were permitted to share.
Almost immediately, I began to hear delay announcements.
Seems that the snow storm I had left, had morphed into fairly violent winds.
Planes were stacked all over the Northeast.
But I did not hear any announcements about the Atlantic City flight. I thought, hoped really, that it was far South enough that it wouldn't be affected.
Then, as I was approaching my seventh hour in the terminal, I went to the gate to double check.
And there I saw it - my flight, originally scheduled to leave at 8:55 was now delayed (supposedly) until 11:30. Seems wind had so delayed flights that everything was affected. My plane was actually going from Detroit to LaGuardia and then down to my location, before returning to Atlantic City.
Suffice to say, it was actually 12:30 when we took off.
The pilot told us that the flight would be smooth, but that there was turbulence on our descent.
So, when we began our descent the turbulence hit.
But, I have been in turbulence before. This was something special. Not really turbulence since it was not bumpy. Just a mere total loss of control of the plane.
The only way I can describe it is as if we were on ice, and someone was shoving first the back and then the front of the plane.
We were literally sliding around the sky and the pilot was desperately trying to keep us on course.
Now, I have flown to the Middle East literally dozens of times. Once on the very day that a plane was brought down over Nairobi by a SAM. I was on a plane on 9/16/01 to Pakistan for business, but I have never been scared on a plane before.
This, I knew was serious.
We continued the buffeting as the captain desperately tried to bring us down.
As we approached the runway, the wind got even worse, and the plane was sliding off course, then being literally shoved back on line by the captain.
Of course, the cabin looked like a scene from the 1970's disaster epic Airport. People holding hands, praying, crying, some laughing, and of course the guy next to me sure that the Captain was incompetent and he was cursing him out.
We got lower and lower, struggling to maintain equilibrium.
The pilot raised the nose of the plane and prepared to touch down.
Suddenly the entire plane listed to the right as if the captain was attempting to imitate the Great Waldo Pepper and do a full body roll with an Airbus A-390.
The left wing dipped to almost 45 degrees. The pilot fought it and righted us.
There was now just a matter of the ground, just feet below the speeding plane.
The pilot gunned the engines and attempted to accelerate out of the landing.
Luckily for all of us, he did. I had never been in an aborted landing before.
He brought us back up and we took a scenic tour of the greater Philadelphia area before we were able to turn successfully to try another landing.
This time, the pilot went into the landing at almost full speed with engines racing, to fight our way through the wind.
At this point, the cabin was dead silent.
Once again, the plane slid around, left to right, feeling like nothing more than that horrible moment when you are driving a car and you hit black ice. You first try to stop the skid but then you have that sick moment when you realize that you can't control the vehicle and you just wait for the inevitable collision with whatever will stop your progress: another car, pole, guard rail.
The captain gunned the engines once more and powered the wheels to the ground. He immediately threw everything into reverse to stop the excessive speed that he had to use to simply fight his way to the ground.
It was now 2 am. My relief at being alive was immediately replaced by worry about the driving conditions and the fact that if I averaged 80 miles an hour with a stop for gas (that means driving between 85-100mph or 140-170kmph) I might make it home by 4 am. And I had to be in Manhattan at 9:30 that morning!!
Well, I made it. The ride home was hairy, but there were no cops and I was able to drive at my freedom, although the wind was vicious still.
Then this morning, it was snowing again on the way into Manhattan.
Whew!! What a trip. Would I do it again? You bet. Not just for the flying, but the treat that I had at the other end of the flight!!!
This weekend of course, I had the best excuse I could ever have and I was one motivated m'er f'er to get on a plane.
However, divorce, changing my life plans and prepping to once again become a student means I have to do it on the cheap.
So, this weekend it meant driving 160 miles to Atlantic City to catch the flight that gave me the sale price that meant flying 1000 miles would be roughly one third the cost of driving that 160 miles to the airport.
So, my flight left at 7:55am. Which meant boarding at 7:25.
Which of course, means a normal person would leave about 3 am to catch the flight.
But I drive FAST. So, I left at 4:30. Just in time for the first serious snow storm of the year.
But the flight down was fun, and I had a wonderful 2 days (despite my friend being sure I didn't!!). In fact, for much of the time I was feeling as relaxed and happy as I have been in quite some time.
So here's the rub. On the way home events started to unfold like a bad Macaulay Culkin movie. I ended up being dropped off at the airport about 8 hours before my scheduled departure.
OK, no prob. I'll read, do some work on the computer, etc. As it turned out though, I was still so exhausted from my early morning the previous day I really couldn't, but still everything was hunky dory.
Then, I hit security.
Yes, you remember my last post about airport security.
Now, it's not that I think the TSA is incompetent but follow this one.
For some reason, despite never having been stopped for my shaving kit, when I was asked (for the first time mind you) if I had any "liquids or creams in containers greater than 3 ounces", I stupidly answered in the affirmative.
So, I was made to remove them.
With a look of disgust, the TSA officer took my 3 oz tube of crest, Palmer's cocoa butter moisturizer and The Body Shop Shave cream, and put it in a dish.
He then proceeded to tell me that I could not go through screening area with these.
Why? I inquired. "That is SOP".
"Explain" queried I, the weary traveler, now a mere 5 1/2 hours early for my flight, but anxiously watching the time tick away.
"Those are the rules" replied my helpful friend, who I had begun to refer to as Shakespeare b/c of his deadpan wit and way with the English language.
Suddenly, the dreaded "supervisor" appeared. Shakespeare told the boss that I had a problem with the "SOP".
I quickly stated that I had no problem with it, despite my experience with the Secret Service, Mossad and other various agencies around the world and the fact that these little tubes of personal products, happily volunteered, were highly unlikely to be the tools of terrorists, particularly in the destination where the conversation was taking place.
"I only have a problem with the fact that I went through this same line 2 weeks ago with the same items, that I did not voluntarily produce, and no one said anything or stopped me". "I would just like to know why, Mr. Supervisor?"
"SOP" replied Shakespeare's literary muse.
"You have to place these items in a 1/2 quart or smaller, resealable, see through plastic bag."
My frustration reaching a boiling point, I put my shoes back on, packed the laptop up and jammed it into my overstuffed briefcase, put the wallet in the left pocket, keys in the right, change in the back right, replaced my watch carefully on my left wrist, closed my overnighter, careful not to let my liquids come in contact with each other for fear of the inevitable explosion (caught you!!), slung my fleece jacket over the briefcase shoulder strap and lifted my bag before trundling off to find a baggie.
Oh wait, forgot to put my shoes back on. The ones that were purchased specifically so that I would not have to remove them at the airport security check. Everything went down on the floor, the shoes were put back on, and the waltz began again.
Well, I hunted down the rare, and quickly disappearing, clear plastic baggie.
Carefully ripped off 99% of it - that's right - it was a 50 gallon garbage bag that the kindly porter in the coffee shop provided to me - tied off the top and proceeded to once again meet the Bard.
So, the repeat performance began.
It seemed my "baggie" did not Federal standards for clear plastic baggie reseal-ability. Apparently my hastily hog tied top of the 55 galloner, did not qualify on the carefully codified section of the Transportation Administrations lengthy treatise on the Federal guidelines on ziploc and other qualifying brands of reusable, non bomb making thermo plastic storage devices.
"Why?" I rudely inquired yet again. No real security cares about Crest toothpaste.
"Because we have to be able to see what you have in the bag".
The screeching of wheels stopping could be heard for miles.
"Excuse me? You mean you have to be able to see the objects that you are currently holding in your hand,... but inside a plastic bag?"
"That's right"
"So is there some magic bomb diffusing characteristics of the ziploc bag that we mere mortals do not grasp?"
That one, he didn't appreciate!!
So, once again I put my shoes back on, packed the laptop up and jammed it into my overstuffed briefcase, put the wallet in the left pocket, keys in the right, change in the back right, replaced my watch carefully on my left wrist, closed my overnighter, careful not to let my liquids come in contact with each other for fear of the inevitable explosion (caught you!!), slung my fleece jacket over the briefcase shoulder strap and lifted my bag before trundling off to find a true baggie but with the unique ability to reseal the fissile material contained within.
Thankfully, the kindly old lady at the information booth just happened to have a box of ziploc bagggies for those of us not up to snuff of the TSA guidelines on transporting deadly explosives.
So, once again, I proceeded through the security check.
Should I tell you that now, on the third time through the x ray machine in under 20 minutes they decided that my briefcase was "suspicious". And that it needed to be wiped down and analyzed with those handi wipes masquerading as mysterious bomb wiping tissues they use?
No, we'll save that for later.
So up the escalator I proceeded, after having once again, redressed myself, picked up my items, packed everything away and issued a final harumph.
I enter that privileged lair that only those lucky enough to have actually purchased a $13 ticket to Atlantic City were permitted to share.
Almost immediately, I began to hear delay announcements.
Seems that the snow storm I had left, had morphed into fairly violent winds.
Planes were stacked all over the Northeast.
But I did not hear any announcements about the Atlantic City flight. I thought, hoped really, that it was far South enough that it wouldn't be affected.
Then, as I was approaching my seventh hour in the terminal, I went to the gate to double check.
And there I saw it - my flight, originally scheduled to leave at 8:55 was now delayed (supposedly) until 11:30. Seems wind had so delayed flights that everything was affected. My plane was actually going from Detroit to LaGuardia and then down to my location, before returning to Atlantic City.
Suffice to say, it was actually 12:30 when we took off.
The pilot told us that the flight would be smooth, but that there was turbulence on our descent.
So, when we began our descent the turbulence hit.
But, I have been in turbulence before. This was something special. Not really turbulence since it was not bumpy. Just a mere total loss of control of the plane.
The only way I can describe it is as if we were on ice, and someone was shoving first the back and then the front of the plane.
We were literally sliding around the sky and the pilot was desperately trying to keep us on course.
Now, I have flown to the Middle East literally dozens of times. Once on the very day that a plane was brought down over Nairobi by a SAM. I was on a plane on 9/16/01 to Pakistan for business, but I have never been scared on a plane before.
This, I knew was serious.
We continued the buffeting as the captain desperately tried to bring us down.
As we approached the runway, the wind got even worse, and the plane was sliding off course, then being literally shoved back on line by the captain.
Of course, the cabin looked like a scene from the 1970's disaster epic Airport. People holding hands, praying, crying, some laughing, and of course the guy next to me sure that the Captain was incompetent and he was cursing him out.
We got lower and lower, struggling to maintain equilibrium.
The pilot raised the nose of the plane and prepared to touch down.
Suddenly the entire plane listed to the right as if the captain was attempting to imitate the Great Waldo Pepper and do a full body roll with an Airbus A-390.
The left wing dipped to almost 45 degrees. The pilot fought it and righted us.
There was now just a matter of the ground, just feet below the speeding plane.
The pilot gunned the engines and attempted to accelerate out of the landing.
Luckily for all of us, he did. I had never been in an aborted landing before.
He brought us back up and we took a scenic tour of the greater Philadelphia area before we were able to turn successfully to try another landing.
This time, the pilot went into the landing at almost full speed with engines racing, to fight our way through the wind.
At this point, the cabin was dead silent.
Once again, the plane slid around, left to right, feeling like nothing more than that horrible moment when you are driving a car and you hit black ice. You first try to stop the skid but then you have that sick moment when you realize that you can't control the vehicle and you just wait for the inevitable collision with whatever will stop your progress: another car, pole, guard rail.
The captain gunned the engines once more and powered the wheels to the ground. He immediately threw everything into reverse to stop the excessive speed that he had to use to simply fight his way to the ground.
It was now 2 am. My relief at being alive was immediately replaced by worry about the driving conditions and the fact that if I averaged 80 miles an hour with a stop for gas (that means driving between 85-100mph or 140-170kmph) I might make it home by 4 am. And I had to be in Manhattan at 9:30 that morning!!
Well, I made it. The ride home was hairy, but there were no cops and I was able to drive at my freedom, although the wind was vicious still.
Then this morning, it was snowing again on the way into Manhattan.
Whew!! What a trip. Would I do it again? You bet. Not just for the flying, but the treat that I had at the other end of the flight!!!
Monday, December 3, 2007
Feeling philolologoolooic.al.... aw hell, thinking about shit!!!
I've been thinking a lot lately about a question regarding people, we of the human species.
Do you think we are who we feel we are in our hearts? Or who we present to the world?
And if they are two different personas, why?
Do you use your heart and instincts as a guide or do you behave in ways (in public) that you think meet the standards that whatever position in life you maintain?
Be honest - I'd like to hear what you really feel, not what you think you should say!
Do you think we are who we feel we are in our hearts? Or who we present to the world?
And if they are two different personas, why?
Do you use your heart and instincts as a guide or do you behave in ways (in public) that you think meet the standards that whatever position in life you maintain?
Be honest - I'd like to hear what you really feel, not what you think you should say!
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Beware the Teddy!!
So British school teacher Gillian Gibbons is on her way back to Britain after high level diplomatic negotiations to free the convicted spy for Britain's MI-6.
What you say? She was not a spy? She was jailed because she is a teacher who asked her young students as part of a story writing assignment to pick a name for a Teddy Bear?
Ridiculous!!! Impossible!!! This is the 21st Century, not the 14th!!
That would be as lucidcrous as millions taking up protest around the world at the site of a 3 or 4 satiric cartoons.
So the students in Gibbons class in the Sudan had the temerity to pick the name Muhammed which immediately convinced the education director of her school that she was mocking the great prophet.
She was lucky, she could have gotten 40 lashes and 60 days in jail for this. Instead for the obscene crime of teaching literacy, she got 21 days in jail and was deported, never to return to her beloved students again.
Is it me? Doesn't anyone see the insanity in this religion?
It's not enough to ask you to try and imagine any other religion in the world conducting itself this way, but that the British government actually has to grovel to the President of the Sudan, makes me sick.
The man responsible for the rape and torture of literally millions of non Muslim and Muslim Sudanese women and children has the nerve to declare himself a "devout" anything!!
And we in the West take it bowing and shufflin.
What you say? She was not a spy? She was jailed because she is a teacher who asked her young students as part of a story writing assignment to pick a name for a Teddy Bear?
Ridiculous!!! Impossible!!! This is the 21st Century, not the 14th!!
That would be as lucidcrous as millions taking up protest around the world at the site of a 3 or 4 satiric cartoons.
So the students in Gibbons class in the Sudan had the temerity to pick the name Muhammed which immediately convinced the education director of her school that she was mocking the great prophet.
She was lucky, she could have gotten 40 lashes and 60 days in jail for this. Instead for the obscene crime of teaching literacy, she got 21 days in jail and was deported, never to return to her beloved students again.
Is it me? Doesn't anyone see the insanity in this religion?
It's not enough to ask you to try and imagine any other religion in the world conducting itself this way, but that the British government actually has to grovel to the President of the Sudan, makes me sick.
The man responsible for the rape and torture of literally millions of non Muslim and Muslim Sudanese women and children has the nerve to declare himself a "devout" anything!!
And we in the West take it bowing and shufflin.
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
The 1947 UN Division of the Mandate of Palestine
********See yesterdays posts and today's earlier post to bring you here*******
Despite the explicit promises of the British, and the League of Nations Mandate for a Jewish Homeland in 1922, Britain, before World War II, began to severely limit Jewish immigration to Palestine.
One of the sick ironies of the Holocaust, is that Adolph Eichmann's first job in the Third Reich was to assist Belgian Jews in emigrating to Palestine as the first "solution to the Jewish question"
As a result of the British discrimination, armies arose in the area, principally the Palmach and the Hagannah.
They resisted British rule in Palestine and agitated for fulfillment of the League of Nations Mandate.
After the establishment of the UN, the General Assembly created a commission to discuss the issue of Palestine.
None of the superpowers (the allies of WWII ) were included.
The commission reccomended, and created, what is now known as the Partition plan.
First, the British had lopped off the largest part of the mandate lands and given it to the Hashemite Kingdom, creating todays Jordan.
So, the UN commission was dealing with only a small percentage of the original Mandate lands.
The division accepted by a vote of 33 - 10 by the General Assembly created Israel in the west, and an Arab state in the east, with Jerusalem to remain an international city.
The vote occurred on this day, 60 years ago.
In the aftermath of the vote, most Jews immediately accepted the plan, most notably, the Jewish Agency, which had been designated as the government in exile, so to speak.
The most notable Jewish group to reject it was Menachem Begin's Irgun, which said that the new Israel would be indefensible as constituted under the plan, and wanted the original mandate lands.
The British however, still had designs on their colonial empire.
The abstained on the vote for the partition (the only allied power to do so, and most significantly refused to organize the transition to the two new states.
As a result, while fighting broke out immediately with Arab attacks on Jerusalem and other Jewish centers, when the British pulled out on May 15, 1948, the War for Independence began in earnest.
The Arab nations met in November and December of 1947 adopting a series of military proposals to drive the Jews from the area.
Below is Resolution 181 of the United Nations General Assembly, known as the Partition Plan.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181
November 29, 1947
The General Assembly, Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)(1) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by l August 1948;
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;
Requests that
The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.*
The General Assembly,
Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
Part I. - Future Constitution and Government of Palestine
A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE
The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.
The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.
The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.
The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.
On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.
The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.
If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.
Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.
The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.
Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.
Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.
During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.
The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provisions for:
Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;
Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations;
Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.
The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co- operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co- operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.
With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.
The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.
The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.
C. DECLARATION
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:
General Provision
The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.
Chapter 1: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.
Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in an way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious, building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or community concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.
No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co- operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.
Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights
Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)
No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.
Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and Financial Obligations
1. Citizenship Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.
2. International conventions
The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.
Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. Financial obligations
The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.
A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.
Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holders and the State.
Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Provisions
The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.
Any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.
The Economic Union of Palestine
The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:
A customs union;
A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.
The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.
The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of the part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.
In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.
In regard to the joint currency system, the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.
So far as is consistent with paragraph 2(b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that - to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources - each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.
All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.
The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.
The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine, consisting of:
The service of the outstanding public debt;
The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.
After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenue may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.
All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority of the Joint Economic Board.
The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.
All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
Freedom of Transit and Visit
# The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.
Termination, Modification and Interpretation of the Undertaking
The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.
Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court Of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
E. ASSETS
The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to iii section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.
During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.
F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Part II. - Boundaries
A. THE ARAB STATE
The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. There it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad Sub-District boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr-I'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre Sub-District boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr-I'nan roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr-I'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias Sub-District to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and 'Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.
The boundary rejoins the Tiberias Sub-District boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the northwest corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west comer, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El-Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection. The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road of I'billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'billin situated to the west of the I'billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.
The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-District boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the Sub-Districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zie'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the District boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El- Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El-Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi 'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras El-Ein road to a point just east of Ras El-Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand El 'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu El-Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El-Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu-Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El-Mismiya El-Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.
From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat El-Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir Esh Sharqiya and 'Ibdis. From the south-east corner of 'Ibdis village it runs to a point southwest of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of 'Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southward along the western village boundary of El-Faluja to the Beersheba Sub-District boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab El-Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the Sub-Districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometer to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometer, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez-Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.
About five kilometres north-east of Ras Ez-Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as 'Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.
The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit-Tima. Thence it runs east of El-Jiya across the village lands of El-Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a southwesterly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. El-Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El-Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-EI 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. El-Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El-Zaiyatin just to the west of El-Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi 'Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.
The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the northwest of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the northeast corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.
B. THE JEWISH STATE
The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.
The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary line to 'Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.
C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM
The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, section B, below).
Part III. - City of Jerusalem(5)
A. SPECIAL REGIME
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, 'Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B ).
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:
Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:
To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
3. Local autonomy
The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.
The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part the present municipality of Jerusalem.
Security measures
The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.
To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
Legislative Organization.
A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.
Administration of Justice.
The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.
Economic Union and Economic Regime.
The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of thc United Nations and their nationals.
Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents.
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.
Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of thc City.
Official languages.
Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.
Citizenship.
All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.
The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.
Freedoms of citizens
Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
Holy Places Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.
The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor. With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.
The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.
In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of regime of the City.
Part IV. Capitulations
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.
Despite the explicit promises of the British, and the League of Nations Mandate for a Jewish Homeland in 1922, Britain, before World War II, began to severely limit Jewish immigration to Palestine.
One of the sick ironies of the Holocaust, is that Adolph Eichmann's first job in the Third Reich was to assist Belgian Jews in emigrating to Palestine as the first "solution to the Jewish question"
As a result of the British discrimination, armies arose in the area, principally the Palmach and the Hagannah.
They resisted British rule in Palestine and agitated for fulfillment of the League of Nations Mandate.
After the establishment of the UN, the General Assembly created a commission to discuss the issue of Palestine.
None of the superpowers (the allies of WWII ) were included.
The commission reccomended, and created, what is now known as the Partition plan.
First, the British had lopped off the largest part of the mandate lands and given it to the Hashemite Kingdom, creating todays Jordan.
So, the UN commission was dealing with only a small percentage of the original Mandate lands.
The division accepted by a vote of 33 - 10 by the General Assembly created Israel in the west, and an Arab state in the east, with Jerusalem to remain an international city.
The vote occurred on this day, 60 years ago.
In the aftermath of the vote, most Jews immediately accepted the plan, most notably, the Jewish Agency, which had been designated as the government in exile, so to speak.
The most notable Jewish group to reject it was Menachem Begin's Irgun, which said that the new Israel would be indefensible as constituted under the plan, and wanted the original mandate lands.
The British however, still had designs on their colonial empire.
The abstained on the vote for the partition (the only allied power to do so, and most significantly refused to organize the transition to the two new states.
As a result, while fighting broke out immediately with Arab attacks on Jerusalem and other Jewish centers, when the British pulled out on May 15, 1948, the War for Independence began in earnest.
The Arab nations met in November and December of 1947 adopting a series of military proposals to drive the Jews from the area.
Below is Resolution 181 of the United Nations General Assembly, known as the Partition Plan.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181
November 29, 1947
The General Assembly, Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)(1) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by l August 1948;
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;
Requests that
The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.*
The General Assembly,
Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
Part I. - Future Constitution and Government of Palestine
A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE
The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.
The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.
The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.
The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.
On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.
The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.
If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.
Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.
The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.
Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.
Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.
During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.
The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provisions for:
Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;
Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations;
Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.
The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co- operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co- operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.
With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.
The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.
The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.
C. DECLARATION
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:
General Provision
The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.
Chapter 1: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.
Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in an way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious, building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or community concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.
No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co- operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.
Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights
Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)
No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.
Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and Financial Obligations
1. Citizenship Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.
2. International conventions
The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.
Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. Financial obligations
The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.
A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.
Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holders and the State.
Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Provisions
The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.
Any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.
The Economic Union of Palestine
The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:
A customs union;
A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.
The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.
The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of the part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.
In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.
In regard to the joint currency system, the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.
So far as is consistent with paragraph 2(b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that - to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources - each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.
All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.
The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.
The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine, consisting of:
The service of the outstanding public debt;
The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.
After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenue may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.
All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority of the Joint Economic Board.
The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.
All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
Freedom of Transit and Visit
# The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.
Termination, Modification and Interpretation of the Undertaking
The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.
Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court Of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
E. ASSETS
The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to iii section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.
During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.
F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Part II. - Boundaries
A. THE ARAB STATE
The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. There it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad Sub-District boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr-I'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre Sub-District boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr-I'nan roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr-I'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias Sub-District to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and 'Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.
The boundary rejoins the Tiberias Sub-District boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the northwest corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west comer, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El-Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection. The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road of I'billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'billin situated to the west of the I'billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.
The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-District boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the Sub-Districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zie'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the District boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El- Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El-Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi 'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras El-Ein road to a point just east of Ras El-Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand El 'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu El-Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El-Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu-Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El-Mismiya El-Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.
From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat El-Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir Esh Sharqiya and 'Ibdis. From the south-east corner of 'Ibdis village it runs to a point southwest of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of 'Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southward along the western village boundary of El-Faluja to the Beersheba Sub-District boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab El-Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the Sub-Districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometer to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometer, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez-Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.
About five kilometres north-east of Ras Ez-Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as 'Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.
The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit-Tima. Thence it runs east of El-Jiya across the village lands of El-Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a southwesterly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. El-Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El-Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-EI 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. El-Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El-Zaiyatin just to the west of El-Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi 'Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.
The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the northwest of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the northeast corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.
B. THE JEWISH STATE
The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.
The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary line to 'Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.
C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM
The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, section B, below).
Part III. - City of Jerusalem(5)
A. SPECIAL REGIME
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, 'Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B ).
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:
Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:
To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
3. Local autonomy
The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.
The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part the present municipality of Jerusalem.
Security measures
The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.
To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
Legislative Organization.
A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.
Administration of Justice.
The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.
Economic Union and Economic Regime.
The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of thc United Nations and their nationals.
Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents.
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.
Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of thc City.
Official languages.
Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.
Citizenship.
All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.
The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.
Freedoms of citizens
Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
Holy Places Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.
Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.
The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor. With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.
The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.
In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of regime of the City.
Part IV. Capitulations
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.
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